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Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing section 310(b)(l) of the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 insofar as it deems interest 
on a state's unregistered general obligations issued after JUne 30, 1983 to be 
taxable income. The bill of complaint seeks a declaration that Section 
310(b)(l) is unconstitutional in that it imposes conditions upon south 
Carolina's power to borrow money and impairs South Carolina's ability to 
function as a sovereign under the Tenth Amendment. This application, 
originally filed with the Chief Justice, is referred to the Conference. 
l'Ihe motion for leave to file a bill of corrplaint appears on List 1, 
Sheet 4 for the June 2, 1983 COnfererce. 
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FACTS: section 310 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsbility Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 stat. 596 (the 1982 Tax Act)~. represents an 
effort by congress to encourage the use of r istered bonds rather thad~ 
bonds (usually with coupons attached). Section 310(b)(l) adds a new 
~ 
subsection (j) to Section 103 of the 1954 Code stating that section 103(a) 
shall not provide an exemption from federal income tax for interest paid by a 
state to its lenders on any registration-required obligation that is not 
issued in registration form. 
south Carolina filed its motion for leave to file a bill of complaint on 
February 9, 1983 and its motion for preliminary injunction on May 10, 1983. 
The SG filed a brief in opposition on May 12, 1983. 
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS: SOuth Carolina maintains 
that this case presents a justiciable controversy over which the court has, 
and should assume, original jurisdiction. It contends that it is the real 
party in interest because the tax exempt status, of its bonds are at issue, and 
because it will be damaged monetarily by enforcement of §310(b)(l). The case 
has substantial importance, according to south carolina, since §310(b)(l) will 
burden South Carolina by an extra $2.8 million on a single moderate-sized sale 
of capital improvement general obligations; will affect general obligation 
bonds issued by other states in excess of $19 million (based on 1982 figures); 
and will affect municipal paper throughout the United states in excess of $70 
billion. secondly, south carolina argues that original jurisdiction is 
appropriate--even ~ough not exclusive--because Congress has effectively 
foreclosed consideration of such cases by a lower court: (a) the 
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 u.s.c. §742l(a), states that no action may be 
maintained which seeks to enjoin the levy or collection of federal taxes; and 
(b) the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. §2201, expressly forbids 
declaratory judgments concerning tax matters. see Alexander v. Americans 
United, Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n. 10 (1974); and cf., Bob Jones UniversitY v. 
Simon, 416 u.s. 725 (1974). 
(2) south Carolina contends that §310(b)(l) impairs its constitutional 
right as a sovereign to borrow money free from federal regulation, as well as 
its express· right under the Tenth Anendment to borrow money. That section, it 
argues, has effectively restricted the alternatives available to south 
carolina to issue obligat~ons in the manner it deems most suitable to effect 
its responsibilities and to perform its essential functions, contrary to 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976) and Hodel v. Virginia 
Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 u.s. 264 (1981). 
(3) SOuth Carolina contends that §310(b)(l) is unconstitutional because 
it subjects the interest paid on the debt obligations . issued ·by the state in 
bearer form to federal income taxation. south Carolina argues that the 
sixteenth Amendment was not intended to grant Congress the J=Ower to tax the 
income from state obligations. 
SG'S CONTENTIONS: (1) The SG contends that this suit is prohibited by 
statute: the Anti-Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the purp::lse of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court by any person;" and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. (Supp~ V) 
2201 precludes issuance of declaratory judgments "with respect to federal 
taxes." Taxpayers seeking to challenge this provision may do so in the u. s. 
Tax court, u.s. Claims Court, or in a DC; but south Carolina is not a taxpayer. 
(2) The only exception to the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act is where 
the taxpayer can demonstrate that equity jurisdiction would otherwise be 
available and where the government clearly cannot prevail on the merits of its 
claim. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 u.s. 725, 737 (1974). This case 
does not fall within that category since the registration requirement is a 
necessary and proper exercise of congressional power granted under Article I. 
Additionally, the registration r~uirement seeks to deter~.violations of 18 ' 
u.s.c. 2314 and 2315 which concern the transportation and disposition of 
stolen or forged securities, and will facilitate apprehension of violators. 
(3} There is no merit, argues the SG, to South Carolina's claim that 
§310(b}(l} imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a necessary 
function of state government. The requirement that securities be issued in 
registered form if the interest therefrom is to be tax exempt in the hands of 
the lender does not restrict the state's borrowing power. It is not 
discriminatory against state obligations since registration is required of 
similar obligations of the United states, and unregistered corporate 
obligations deny the issuer an income tax deduction for interest paid. And 
south carolina's claim of monetary damage ignores the offsetting benefits of 
handling and insurance resulting from reduced risks of loss or theft, all of 
which add to the attractiveness of registered bonds. Clearly §310(b)(l) does 
not in fact limit, modify, or qualify a state's borrowing power. 
(4) Original jurisdiction should not be exercised in a case such as this 
case where jurisdiction in this Court is not exclusive. A district court 
plainly could hear the case more promptly; and the jurisdictional and 
constitutional questions presented in this case are not of sufficient urgency 
to the country to demand this Court's attention. 
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS REGARDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: South Carolina 
argues that a preliminary injunction is warranted because: (1) the July 1, 
1983 effective date of the Act is likely to arrive without a decision by this 
Court regarding the bill of complaint; (2) the issues presented in this case 
are of substantial importance because some 24 states have now joined in south 
Carolina's request for the Court to assume original jurisdiction; (3} a 
preliminary injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo beyond their 
July 1, 1983 effective date of the Act; (4) irreparable injury will result to 
California in the form of incre~sed economic burden and impaired state 
sovereignty. 
DISCUSSION: only the motion for preliminary injunction is before the 
Court at this time, not the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. 
----------------~~--· -------------
ASide from the issues of original jurisdiction an~ the likelihood of 
success on the merits, South Carolina has failed to demonstrate irreparable 
harm. Even assuming the validity of its arguments addressing those issues, no 
substantial harm (other than administrative preparation) will begall South 
Carolina before July 1, 1983--the effective date of the Act. Thus south 
carolina seeks relief essentially to restrain enforcement of the Act after 
that date in the belief that the Court may be unable to reach a decision prior 
to that time. As noted earlier, the bill of complaint is set for the June 2, 
1983 conference. Hence injunctive relief pending decision at least on the 
motion for leave to file the bill of cornplaint .at this point seems 
unnecessary. I recommend that the request for injunctive relief be denied. 
Alternatively, it might be relisted for consideration at the June 1, 1983 
along with the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint. 
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SOUTH CAROLINA 
v. 
REGAN, secretary of Treasury 
·, 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
SUMMARY: Pending decision on its motion for leave to file a bill of 
complaintl under the Court's original jurisdiction, South carolina seeks to 
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing Section 310(b)(l) of the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 insofar as it deems interest 
on a state's unregistered general obligations ·issued after JUne 30, 1983 to be 
taxable income. The bill of complaint seeks a declaration that Section 
310(b)(l) is unconst~tutional in that it iffiP?ses conditions upon South 
Carolina's power to borrow money and impairs South carolina's ability to 
function as a sovereign under the Tenth Amendment. This application, 
originally filed with the Chief Justice, is referred to the Conference. 
lThe motion for leave to file a bill of complaint appears on List 1, 
Sheet 4 for the June 2, 1983 Conference . 
.. . 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596 (the 1982 Tax Act)~ represents an 
effort by COngress to encourage the use of registered bonds rather than bearer 
bonds (usually with coupons attached). Section 310(b)(l) adds a new 
subsection (j) to Section 103 of the 1954 Oode stating that section 103(a) 
shall not provide an exemption from federal income tax for interest paid by a 
... '"-' .-~ ...... ~,....... ..... ......, .... -= ,...,... , , 
state to its lenders ~ arz reg~}ion-required obligation that is not 
issued in registration form. 
south Carolina filed its motion for leave to file a bill of complaint on 
February 9, 1983 and its motion for preliminary injunction on May 10, 1983. 
The SG filed a brief in opposition on May 12, 1983. 
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS: SOuth Carolina maintains 
that this case presents a justiciable controversy over .which the court has, 
and should assume, original jurisdiction. It contends that it is the real 
party in interest because the tax exempt status .. ~f its bonds are at issue, and 
because it will be damaged monetarily by enforcement of §310(b}(l). The case 
has substantial importance, according to south Carolina, since §310(b}(l} will 
burden South Carolina by an extra $2.8 million on a single moderate-sized sale 
of capital improvement general obligations; will affect general obligation . ............. --- . 
bonds issued by other states in excess of $19 million (based on 1982 .figUres); 
and will affect municipal paper throughout the United states in excess of $70 
billion. secondly, south carolina argues that original jurisdiction is 
appropriate--even though not exclusive--because Congress has effectively 
foreclosed consideration of such cases by a lower court: (a} the 
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §742l(a), states that no action may be 
maintained which seeks to enjoin the levy or collection of federal taxes; and 
(b) the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. §2201, expressly forbids 
• < • 
United, Inc., 416 u.s. 752, 759 n. 10 (1974); and cf., Bop Jones University v. 
Simon, 416 u.s. 725 (1974). 
' . 
(2) South carolina contends that §310(b)(l) impairs its constitutional 
right as a sovereign to borrow money free from federal regulation, as well as 
its express right under the Tenth Anendment to borrow ~~ney. That section, it 
argues, has effectively restricted the alternatives available to south 
C<i!olina to i~s_in the manner it deems most suitable to effect 
~ ~ '--,.....-., 
its responsibilities and to perform its essential functions, contrary to 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976) and Hodel v. Virginia 
Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
(3) South Carolina contends that §310(b)(l) is unconstitutional because 
it subjects the interest paid on the debt obligationsissued by the state in 
bearer form to federal income taxation. South Carolina argues that the 
Sixteenth Amendment was not intended to grant C?ngress the power to tax the 
income from state obligations. 
SG 1 S CONTENTIONS: (1) The SG contends that this suit is prohibited by 
statute: the Anti-Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the p.1rpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court by any person; • and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. (Supp. V) 
2201 precludes issuance of declaratory judgments "with respect to federal 
taxes.• Taxpayers seeking to challenge this provision may do so in the U. s. 
Tax court, u.s. Claims court, or in a DC; but south Carolina is not a taxpayer. 
(2) 'rtle only exception to the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act is where 
the taxpayer can demonstrate that equity jurisdiction would otherwise be 
available and where the government clearly cannot prevail on the merits of its 
claim. Bob Jones University v. simon, 416 u.s. 725, 737 (1974). This case 
does not fall within that category since the registration requirement is a 
necessa~y dJ~ p~upec exe~c~se or cong~ess~ona~ power grant~a unaer Art1Cle I. 
Additionally, the registration r~uirement seeks to deter-violations of 18 
u.s.c. 2314 and 2315 which concern the transportation and disposition of 
' · 
stolen or forged securities, and will facilitate apprehension of violators. 
(3) There is no merit, argues the SG, to South Carolina's claim that 
§310(b)(l) imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a necessary 
\ 
function of state government. The requirement that securities be issued in 
registered form if the interest therefrom is to be tax exerrpt in the hands of 
the lender does not restrict the state's borrowing power. It is not 
-----------------~~-------~~--~------------
discriminatory against state obligations since registration is required of - -
similar obligations of the United states, and unregistered corporate 
------~---~~----~---------------obligations deny the issuer an income tax deduction for interest paid. .. And 
south carolina's claim of monetary damage ignores the offsetting benefits of -
handling and insurance resulting from reduced risks of loss or theft, all of 
which add to the attractiveness of registered bopds. Clearly §310(b)(l) does 
not in fact limit, modify, or qualify a state's borrowing power. 
(4) Original jurisdiction should not be exercised in a case such as this 
case where jurisdiction in this Court is not exclusive. A district court 
plainly could hear the case more promptly; and the jurisdictional and 
constitutional questions presented in this case are not of sufficient urgency 
to the country to demand this Court's attention. 
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS REGARDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: South Carolina 
argues that a preli~nary injunction is warranted because: (1) the July 1, 
1983 effective date of the Act is likely to arrive without a decision by this 
Court regarding the bill of complaint; (2) the issues presented in this case 
are of substantial importance because some 24 states have now joined in South 
carolina's request for the Court to assume original jurisdiction; (3) a 
preliminary injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo beyond their 
---~ _, ---- - - -- - - -- - - --- - p '-, -- - . - - - ------- -·--., --.J,. ··---
california in the form of incre~sed economic burden and impaired state 
sovereignty. 
DISCUSSION: Only the motion for preliminary injunction is before the 
court at this time, not the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. 
Aside from the issues of original jurisdiction anq the likelihood of 
·, 
success on the merits, south carolina has failed to demonstrate irreparable 
harm. Even assuming the validity of its arguments addressing those issues, no 
substantial harm (other than administrative preparation) will begall south 
Carolina before July 1, 1983--the effective date of the Act. Thus south 
Carolina seeks relief essentially to restrain enforcement of the Act after 
that date in the belief that the Court may be unable to reach a decision prior 
to that time. As noted earlier, the bill of complaint is set for the June 2, 
1983 Conference. Hence injunctive relief pending decision at least on the 
motion for leave to file the bill of complaint.at this point seems 
unnecessary. I recommend that the request for injunctive relief be denied. 
Alternatively, it might be relisted for consideration at the June 1, 1983 
along with the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint. 
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SOUTH CARU,INA J' r Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
v. 
REGAN, sec. of Treasury 
SUMMARY: South Carolina seeks to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury 
from enforcing section 310(b)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
'l '~ 
Act of 1982 insofar as it deems interest on a state's unregistered general 
obligations issued after June 30, 1983 to be taxable income. South carolina 
also seeks leave to file a bill of complaint under the Court's original 
jurisdiction for a declaration that section 310(b)(l) is unconstitutional in 
that it imposes conditions upon south carolina's power to borrow money and 
impairs South Carolina's ability to function as a sovereign under the Tenth 
Amendment. 
BACKGROUND: 'Ihe facts and contentions pertaining to both the bill of 
complaint and the injunction are set forth in a Legal Office memorandum 
~ prepared and circulated for the May 19, 1983 Conference. A copy is attached. 
~ ~ri\~ ~ ~ bl ~.-\c. f~ ~· ~k .\AAUll ~ ~ ~ 
. 6s.c. ~ ~ u~ ~- ~\... <'owJ. 




ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: In my view, this case is appropriate for exercise 
of the Court's original, nonexclusive jurisdiction: the ease presents a 
justiciable controversy; the state of south carolina appears to be the real 
party in interest as its bonds ~ affected by the Act~the question . .....¥ .............. ~ .... ....., sq ' 
presented is substantially a legal one, not requiring extensive factual 
development in district court. The SG contends that the, issue is not 
sufficiently important to warrant the attention of this court. However, it 
would appear that the contrary is true since any deci~n wc:_uld equally ,, . -,
~ affect the 24 states who have joined south Carolina's request. This case is 
~ ~-~~~~--------------~ ~~unlike United states v. Nevada, 412 u.s. 534 (1973) where this Court declined 
/);"/ 
to exercise its original jurisdiction on a claim seeking to settle water 
rights within a single state; rather, the issue presented affects the rights 
of half the states in the Nation. As regards the subject matter, it more 
-----------~~ t 
closely resembles United states v. North Carolina, 136 u.s. 211 (1889), which 
involved a claim by the United states to recover.against a state on its bonds 
and leave to file a bill of complaint was granted. 
INJUNCTION: The SG contends that this suit for injunctive and 
declaratory relief is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. This court addressed a similar issue in Alexander v. "Americans 
United", 416 u.s. 752, 758-59 (1974) where it said: 
To reiterate, the Court in Williams Packing [370 u.s. 1 
(1962)] unanimously held that a pre-enforcement injunction 
against the assessment or collection of taxes may be 
granted only (i) "if it is clear that under no circumstances 
could the Government ultimately prevail •.• ,"and (ii) "if 
equity jurisdiction otherwise exists." Ibid. Unless both 
conditions are met, a suit for preventive-Injunctive relief 
must be dismissed. 
" ' 
If the existence of equity jurisdiction in this Court may be assumed, then it 
would appear that the injunction requested should be denied unless it is clear 
that the government could not ultimately prevail under. any circumstances. In 
my view, such is not the case. The SG has presented conpelli03 justification 
for section §310(b)(l): that it is a necessary and proper exercise of 
congressional power under Article I; that it seeks to deter violations of 18 
u.s.c. 2314 and 2315 which concern the transportation and disposition of 
stolen or forged securities; that a state's borrowi03 power is not restricted 
simply by the requirement that securities be issued in a registered form; that 
the requirement is not di~natory, etc. Hence, because the government 
could ultimately prevail, Williams Packing would seem to direct that 
injunctive relief be denied. 
BILL OF COMPLAINT: The remaini03 issue appears to be whether section 
310(b)(l) imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a necessary 
function of state government. The SG contends that this issue lacks 
sufficient import to warrant exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction. 
south carolina contends that section 310(b)(l) will impair its constitutional 
right as a sovereign to borrow money free from federal regulation as well as 
its express right under the Tenth Amendment to borrow money. It maintains 
that the section has effectively restricted its alternatives to issue 
obligations in the manner it deems suitable. Although I remain unpersuaded as 
to the merits of south Carolina's claim, I consider the issue sufficiently 
meritorious to warrant exercise of the court's original jurisdiction, 
particularly in light of the number of states affected. 
CONCLUSION: I reconmend that the motion for injunctive relief be denied, 
that the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint be granted, that a 
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PERSONAL 
94 Orig. South Carolina v. Regan 
TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The above case, set for argument on October 5, in-
volves - as the substantive constitutional question - the 
validity of a provision of the fe~eral 1982 Tax 'ct that had 
the effect, after June 30, 1983, of requiring that municipal 
bonds be issued in registered form if the interest thereon 
·· i.s to be exempt from federal i..ncome taxation. 
,~ ~· 
.I The briefs, filed on behalf of South Carolina and 
th'e amicus brief on behalf of. 24 other states, i.nclud inq 
·~~fidavtts, argue that the e~fect of this requirement i~ to 
bu.:r;den the sovereign authority of Rtates to borrow money. 
The affidavits assert that most municipal bonds had been 
; issued in bearer form, and that the re~uirement of reglstra-
.• tion will add substantial additional costs to the borrowing 
Qf money. One of the elements of additional cost is an in-
crease in interest payahle by 1/4-1/2 percent. In a~dition 
· the fees of the paying and transfer agents (usually hanks) 
are higher for the handling of registered than for bearer 
bonds . 
I am prompt~d to circulate this memorandum because 
my family accounts, rnanaqed by United Virginia Bank, contain 
rnunJcipal bonds. 1 am informed by the bank that most of the 
municipal bonds it holds in most if not all of its accounts 
are in bearer form excPpt those purchased since June 30. At 
least arguably, I suppose - if the affidavits are correct -
. the purchasers of municipal bonds issued after June 30 may 
benefit from some increase in interest rates . 
This presents a question of disqualification for 
me . It occurs to me that possibly other ,Just ices have the 
same auestion . The Reporter ' s Notes to the ABA Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct state that "government securities" do not 
require disqualification unless "the value of [the] int~rest 
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the 
: "'· . 
. ' 
' '· ,..., .. ' 
~~ . -... 
2. 
proceedings ••• " p. 71. I doubt that one's interest would 
be "substantially affected" in view of the various factors 
that influence the price of these bonds at the time of issue 
and again at the time a person happens to acquire them. The 







violates the lOth Amendment by requiring the states to issue 
general obligation municipal bonds in fully registered form 




c;/h,.-f.::. " /1 ~ IAN!-~ 
(7~ ~ /-? F~. ~t:::='~~-~-A . L~_J-A>. 





' . ' 
·'' , . 
Outline of Memorandum Page 
I. BACKGROUND: The TEFRA Amendment 3 
II. DISCUSSION 4 
A. Jurisdiction 4 
1. Anti-Injunction Act 5 
2. Declaratory Judgment Act 8 
3. Summary 11 
B. Merits 12 
1. Constitutionality of Tax on Municipal Bond Interest 12 
2. Tenth Amendment 14 
III. CONCLUSION 20 
·~ . ....... ;\ .... 
~ I. BACKGROUND: The TEFRA Amendment 
Prior to the TEFRA Amendment, §103(a) of the IRC 
provided that the interest payable on all general obligation 
bonds issued by the states, or their political subdivisons, would 
be exempt from federal income tax. Section 310(b) (1) of TEFRA 
amended §103(a) to eliminate the exemption from federal income 
tax for interest on any "registration-required" obligation that 
--------------~ 
is not issued in registered form. The registration requirement 
applied to virtually all general obligation municipal bonds. 
South Carolina argues that this amendment effectively prohibits 
it from offering municipal bonds in bearer form and that because 
it intrudes on the state's sovereign power to borrow money, 
§310(b) (1) violates the lOth Amendment. 
~~ Section 310(b) (1) is but one of the statutory provisions 
~ rough which Congress has attempted- to eliminate the use of 
bearer bonds. The other provisions in §310 require that 
~~rtually every obligation of the United States be in registered 
~form and dictate adverse tax consequences for private issuers and 
purchasers of bearer bonds. See SG's Brief at 3-4 The expressed 
purpose of the statutory effort to curtail the use of bearer 
bonds was to obtain a fairer and more efficient system of 
information reporting and withholdin~ reduce tax avoidance, ~ 
an~ reduce the volume of "readily negotiable substitu~ for 
ca~le to persons engaged in illegal activities." 1 s. 
Rep. No. 97-494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1982) South Carolina 
claims that these goals do not justify the federal intrusion on 





Because this case involves a sui ~ \between a state and a 
(S-4:.trft~;> 
of another state, this Court has original but not 
1\ 
exclusive jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. Art. III, Clause 2 The 
decision whether to exercise this jurisdiction generally is 
discretionary. However, the ~liciter General argues that in 
this case the Court is barred from exercising jurisdiction by two 
statutes - the~nti-Injunction Act and th~federal tax exception 
to the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 u.s.c. §742l(a), provides in 
relevant part that 
"[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be 
c---..__· 
in any court by any person, whether 
is the person against whom such tax 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. §2201, provides 
In a case of actual controversy within its 
jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any~~ 
court of the United States, upon the filing of an ~~~ fv 
appropriate pleading may declare the rights or other  
legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could 
added) 
two statutes are applicable 
bar suit in the lower courts. However, it argues that the 
bar suit in this Court because Congress may not ........__ _____, 
itutionally granted original 
- ---- -· -
ution of the constitutional issue is 
suit is not statutorily barred. 
As you wrote in ~ob Jones University v. Simon, 416 u.s. 
725, 736 (1974), the Anti-Injunction Act "has no legislative 
history, but its language could scarcely be more explicit." 
Nevertheless, the courts have maintained "a cyclical pattern of 
allegiance to the ~ain meaning of the Act." 416 u.s. at 742 
This ended with this Court's decision in Enoch v. Williams 
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), which held that the 
Act applies absent a showing that the Service's position is 
plainly without a legal basis. ~ob Jones re-enforced the Court's 
commitment to the plain language of the Act. Thus, any 
irreparable harm that enforcement of §310(b) (1) would occasion 
does not create an exception to the Act, and petitioner does not 
so argue. 
Neither does petitioner argue that because its suit does 
not seek to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes it is 
not barred by the Act. This arguement also is foreclosed by the 
. ' . 
; 
decision in Bob Jones. In that case, an injunction would have 
prevented the assessment and collection of taxes both from the 
petitioner and from the petitioner's donors. In this case, South 
Carolina is not a taxpayer, and an injunction would prevent 
assessment and collection only from those who purchase the -state's general obligation bonds. This distinction is 
~i~nt. You wrote in Bob Jones: "~etitioner 
seeks to lower the taxes of those other than itself, the Act is 
nonetheless controlling." 416 u.s. at 725 Thus, as to the Anti-
WJL~ 
Injunction Act, the Court may not avoid the constitutional 
question that South Carolina presents. ~' 
--------........ ~. '-7 
Although it has ne~ressly so held, the Court has 
suggested that Congress may no!:.._liffii.t_ this Court's original __ __.......,___. ---- "---- .... _ ...... .......... 
jurisdiction. In California v. Arizona, 440 u.s. 59, 66 (1979), 
the Court in dicta stated that "Congress has broad powers over 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts ••• but it is extremely 
doubtful that they include the power to limit the original 
jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution." 
Alternately, the Court could reach the due process challenge to 
the Act that was left open in Bob Jones. In that case, the 
'""'" 
taxpayer had several means of acquiring judicial review. Because 
it was liable fo~ various taxes under the challenged revenue 
ruling, it could petition the Tax Court to review a notice of 
deficiency after assessment. Or, it could pay the taxes and then 
bring a refund suit in federal district court or in the Court of 
Claims. Finally, petitioner in Bob Jones could secure a 
"friendly donor" who would be willing to make a contribution and 
then litigate its deductability. Because South Carolina is not a 
taxpayer, only the third course is available here. You noted in 
a footnote in Bob Jones that the "friendly donor" alternative may 
not satisfy due process requirements. 416 u.s. at 747 n.21 
Forcing South Carolina to rely on a "friendly bond 
purchaser" seems especially inadequate. Although a sense of 
~ to the community plays a part in the purchase of municipal bonds, ~ 
these debt instruments are purchased in large part for profit. 
South Carolina argues convincingly that without tax-exempt 
interest, or significantly higher interest rates, bearer bonds 
will not sell. I question whether consistent with due process 
this Court may condition South Carolina's access to judicial 
review on its ability to persuade a potential bond purchaser to 
make an unattractive investment and then to endure rigorous 
litigation with the IRS. If the Court does create a due process 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, it should be a narrow one, 
limited to situations where the interested party is not a 
taxpayer and will have no other opportunity to seek judicial 
review. Otherwise, the exception will encourage much future 
litigation by other plaintiffs claiming that various applications 
·. 
of the Act violate due process. Because a due process exception 
to the Act would make other forums available to petitioner, this 
Court would not need to exercise its original jurisdiction. 
2. Declaratory Judgment Act 
In 1934, Congress created a new remedy that allowed 
parties to obtain a declaration of their rights and legal 
obligations, whether or not additional relief was requested. 
Reaffirming the restrictions contained in the Anti-Injunction 
Act, Congress immediately excepted from this new remedy any 
controversy over ; Eederal tax liabilit~\ In Bob Jones, you noted 
that "[t]here is no dispute ••• that the federal tax exception to 
theVOeclaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the Anti-
------------~ 
Injunction Act." 416 u.s. at 733 n.7 
There is no constitutional problem with this statutory 
limitation. Unlike traditional equity relief, declaratory 
relief is a statutory creation. Congress decided that such 
relief was appropriate only in certain cases. Cases concerning 
federal tax liability w~re not among them. Congress 
-
constitutionally may create a special remedy applicable to all 
cases or only to some cases but in all courts. "Either action 
would bind this Court even in the exercise of its original 
jurisdicticin." However, no constitutional problem would arise 
~-----~----~ ---- - ~ 
unless Congress simultaneously conferred original jurisdiction 
over declaratory actions in federal courts and withdrew the 
original jurisdiction of this Court. Cf. California v. Arizona, 
440 u.s. at 65 (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity). 
One might argue that 26 u.s.c. §7478, which was passed 
after Bob Jones, indicates a legislative intent to exclude from 
'-- 7 
the federal tax exception of the Declaratory Judgment Act all -requests for declaratory relief under §103(a) made by issuers of 
government securities. 1 Section 7478 provides 
In a case of actual controversy involving -
(1) a determination by the Secretary whether 
prospective obligations are described in section 103(a) 
.•• upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, the Tax 
Court may make a declaration whether such prospective 
obligations are described in section 103(a). 
The purpose behind the provision is to permit government issuers 
to obtain a determination whether the interest payable on their 
government securities will .be tax exempt. Implicit in this ~ ~ 
provision is a recognition that suits for refund do not ~. 
adequately protect an is~uer's interest under §103(a). If there 
is some question whether the exemption applies, the government 
.... -------"""""-- ~-----
securitie~ll not fare well in the market. The only way to 
ensure against this soft market is to obtain advance assurance of 
a §103(a) exemption. If no exemption is available, the 
government may well consider alternate ways of raising money. 
This is ~actly South Carolina's position. The state 
1Neither South Carolina nor the amici make this argument. 
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has legitimate doubts concerning the constitutionality of ~ 
§310(b) (1). Before it makes the costly switch to registered 
bonds, or makes the equally costly decision to issue bearer bonds 
at a higher interest rate, it wishes to have those doubts 
resolved. This case seems to fit squarely within the legislative 
purpose of §7478. However, it does not fit within its statutory 7'~ 
l~gua~. The declaratory judgment authorized by this section 
must be brought intially in the Tax Court and only after the 
issuer has exhausted administrative remedies. The procedural 
requirements and the statutory language seem to "limit the scope 
of the proceeding to issues of statutory coverage or 
construction." (SG's Brief at 5 n.6) It seems inappropriate to 
direct to the Tax Court, and to administrative proceedings, the 
question whether or not a provision of the IRC is constitutional. 
Thus, pe~itioner may maintain its claim for declaratory 
relief only if this Court is willing to rely on the legislative 
intent behind §7478 ' to imply an exception from the otherwise 
unqualified federal tax liability exception to the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. There are several advantages to this statutory 
construction. First, the Court may avoid the constitutional 
issues presented by the Anti-Injunction Act. If South Carolina 
~ 
may ~eek declaratory relief, there is no practical need for an 
~ ~- ~ ~--------
injunction. 
~ 
Second, this Court would not have to address the . 
merits. Because other forums will be available to entertain 
petitioner's claim for declaratory relief, this Court need not 
exercise its original jurisdiction. Third, the interpretation 
creates a very small exception to the federal tax exception of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, and one that Congress arguably 
intended. 
3. Summary 
I recommend that the Court exercise its original 
jurisdiction under the Anti-Injunction Act on the ground that 
Congress may not restrict the constitutional grant of such -~ -------.......__. _______________ ............__----- -
jurisdiction • .....____..., This creates the narrowest possible exception to -the Anti-Injunction Act. The d~ process exception to the Act is 
equally respectable and may be sufficiently narrowed so as not to 
undermine the Act. I hesitate recommending that course only ~­
because it has not been briefed. Although the due process ~ 
exception would not require the Court to exercise its original ~ . 
jurisdicition, sending the case back to federal district court~. 
may create a delay that will be extremely costly to the state~ 
bond market. If the delay is tolerable it may be wise to choose 
that course. The above suggested statutory interpretation of the 
§7478 is strained and also is not briefed. 
B. Merits 
South Carolina raises two constitutional challenges to 
§310(b) (1). First, it argues that the tax-exempt status of 
interest payable on municipal bonds is not conferred by statute 
but by the Constitution. Thus, Congress may not authorize a --federal income tax on the interest paid on municipal bearer 
' # I•""' .. 
bonds. Second, petitioner argues that borrowing money is a 
fundamental aspect of state sovereignty. Any attempt by Congress 
to prescribe how the states must exercise that sovereign power 
violates the lOth Amendment. 
1. Consti~~Ta~u;~~~ ~ 
---? --. ~~- ~lev~~ I 
South Carolina argues that the constitutional immunity 
of both federal and state governments from taxation by the other ~~ 
~ 
prohibits a federal income tax on the interest on municipal 
bonds, and thus that §310(b) (1) is unconstitutional. I disagree.~ 
Petitioner relies exclusively on this Court's decision in Pollack 
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 u.s. 429 (1894), and on the 
historical tax exemption accorded municipal bond interest. 
Pollack was a pre-16th Amendment case. To the extent that it 
held that a tax on income from property interests was a direct 
tax that could not be individually levied on the citizens of the 
state, it has been overruled by the 16th Amendment. 2 To the 
extent that it held that a tax on the interest on municipal bonds 
constituted an unconstitutional tax on the issuing government, 
its reasoning has been repudiated. Since enactment of 
Amendment, the historical exemption for municipal bond ---has been purely statutory. 
the 16th ? 
inte! est) 
2Before the 16th Amendment, all direct federal taxes imposed on 
the citizens of a state had to be apportioned according to the 
state's representation in Congress. 
~ 
J-Lv~ 
Applying the doctrine of government immunity from 
taxation, Pollack reasoned that any tax that worked an economic 
burden on state government was an unconstitutional tax on the 
state. 3 157 u.s. at 586 This Court expressly has rejected that 
reasoning. In Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 u.s. 466, 
480 (1939), the Court held that 
The theory, which once won a qualified approval, that a 
tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its 
source, is no longer tenable. 
Since Graves, this Court consistently has held that non-
discriminatory taxes, the legal incidence of which do not fall on 
federal or state government, do not violate the constitutional 
immunity of government from taxation. See, e.g., Memphis Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Garner, 51 U.S.L.W. 4104 (Jan. 24, 1983); United 
States v. Fresno, 429 u.s. 452 (1977). 
-r/.. ./\/, .A-> The TEFRA amendment to §103(a) does not impose a ~~~ 
discriminatory tax on the interest payable on municipal bonds. ~ 
All government bonds - federal and state - must be in 
registered form. The Court observed in Graves that a non---discriminatory tax imposed on those who deal with state or 
federal government may violate the constitutional immunity of 
that government only where "the economic burden on the ••• 
government is tantamount to an . ~nterference by one government 
3Pollack expressly relied for this proposition on the Court's 
decision in Collector v. ~, 78 u.s. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870), and 
Dobbins v. Commissioners, 41 u.s. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), both of 
which have been overruled. 
with the other in performance of its functions." 306 u.s. at 481 
The constitutionality of a state tax that burdens the federal 
government raises an issue under the Supremacy Clause. The 
constitutionality of a federal tax that burdens a state 
government raises an issue under the lOth Amendment. 
2. Tenth Amendment 
The challenged regulation is an exercise of Congress's 
taxing powers rather than its powers under the Commerce Clause. 
-, ~
This does not seem to change the lOth Amendment analysis. The 
Court stated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 
842 (1976), that "there are limits upon the power of Congress to 
override state sovereignity, even when exercising its otherwise 
plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce." Thus, §310(b) (1) 
violates the lOth Amendment if it significantly interferes with 
South Carolina's ability to exercise a sovereign power. The 
sovereign power implicated in this case is the power to borrow 
money. This is a fundamental sovereign power reserved to the 
states by the lOth Amendment. See Pollack, 157 u.s. at 585 The 
degree of federal interference that this sovereign power will 
tolerate under the lOth Amendment must be measured under the 
analysis proposed by Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. 
Ass ' n, 4 52 u. S . 2 6 4 ( 19 81) • 
~Hodel articulated a three-part test to identify lOth 
Amendment violations. Federal action violates the lOth Amendment 
only if it satisfies all three parts of that test. First, the 
federal action must regulate the states as states. Second, the 
federal action must "address matters that are indisputably 
attributes of state sovereignty." Finally, it must be apparent 
that the federal action "would directly impair [the state's] 
ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional 
government functions." 4 452 u.s. at 287-88 
The first two requirements of the Hodel test are 
satisfied in this case. Although the federal tax falls on 
individual bondholders, the motivating purpose of §310(b) (1) was 
to "encourage" states to issue registered bonds. The federal law 
does not require the states to issue registered bonds. However, 
the alternative is, according to petitioner, economically 
unfeasible. Providing such a choice arguably is federal 
regulation in substance if not in form. To the extent that the 
expressed intent of the federal law is to deter states from 
issuing municipal bearer bonds, it regulates the st~tes as 
states. As to the second requirement, §310(b) (1) clearly 
"addresses" the state's power to borrow money, and this power is 
"indisputably [an] attribute[] of state sovereignty." It is the 
requirement that is the most troublesome. 
Section 310(b) (1) is offensive because it intrudes on 
sovereign power to borrow money. South Carolina 
that the intrusion impairs its ability to perform its 
4Even if all three of these requirements are met, there may be 
no lOth Amendment violation if the federal interest protected by 
the contested federal action justifies the intrusion into state 











traditional government functions by raising the costs of 
borrowing, decreasing the state's revenue, and leaving fewer 
resources available for other vital state services. Under the 
third prong of the Hodel test, the measure of tolerable federal 
intrusion is a matter of degree, necessitating an inquiry into 
the practical effect of the challenged provision. 
According to South Carolina's brief, and the briefs and 
affidavits submitted by the amici, issuing municipal bonds in 
fully registered form would increase the interest rate by 1/4% to 
1/2% over that payable on bearer bonds. This projected increase 
~---
is attributable to two factors: (1} underwriters believe that 
reg1stered bonds are more difficult to sell: and, (2} 
registration increases the fees that paying agents charge 
issuers. As illustrative of the effect of this interest increase 
on the cost of state borrowing, South Carolina refers to a 1982 
bond issue of $115 million. The bonds were issued in bearer form 
with a maturity period of 15 years and interest of 8.667%. The 
total interest cost to South Carolina over the life of the bonds 
will be $97,247,668. If the bonds had been issued in registered 
form, the interest would have increased 1/4% to 8.92%. This 
would have saddled South Carolina with an additional $2.8 million 
in interest costs over the 15 year life of the bonds. The state 
argues that if, as projected, the registration requirement adds 
an additional $2.8 million to its interest cost on a single 
"moderately" sized bond issue, the cumulative burden of these 
added costs will impair seriously its ability to borrow money and 
to perform its traditional government functions. 
The SG's brief takes issue with this . analysis. The SG 
argues that South Carolina's projected increase in costs ignores 
the "offsetting economies of handling and insurance, resulting 
from reduced risk of loss or theft." (SG's Brief at 9) I know 
too little about the bond business to evaluate either argument. 
I will look into it more if you like. 
Assuming that South Carolina's cost projection is 
accurate, the Court must determine whether the degree of federal 
------------------~ 
intrusion is tolerable under the third prong of the Hodel test. 
~
In EEOC v. Wyoming, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219 (March 2, 1983), the Court 
held that a federal regulation runs afoul of the lOth Amendment 
only if it threatens the state's "separate and independent" 
existence. In resolving that issue, the first question is 
whether the contested exercise of Congress's taxing power is 
sufficiently coercive to amount to an intrusion at all. "Every 
tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes 
an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with 
others not taxed •••• [T]he location of the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be an inducement 
[is] a question of degree." Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
u.s. 548, 589-90 (1937) (Cardoza, J.). The coercive effect of 
§310(b) (1) depends on the ecomomic feasibility of offering bearer 
bonds that do not provide tax-exempt interest and the costliness 
of offering registered bonds. There is a factual dispute over 
both those issues. Assuming a fair degree of coercion, the 
existence of a choice nevertheless ameliorates the intrusion 
somewhat. There was no such choice in National League of Cities. 
.;;. 
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The intrusion in this case seems closer to the one 
~lerated in Wyoming than the one found offensive in National 
League of Cities.s The Court in Wyoming found that the contested 
federal regulation required the state to achieve its goals 
consistently with federal standards but that it did not "require 
the state to abandon those goals." Arguably, the same is true in 
this case. South Carolina may continue to borrow money by 
issuing municipal bonds that pay tax-exempt interest as long as 
those bonds conform to the federal regulations on registration. 
Moreover, South Carolina may continue to borrow money by issuing 
municipal bearer bonds if it is willing to relinquish the 
attractive market feature of tax-exempt interest. 
/tolerableT:yt::ee:::::a:h::t::::::~t:::r::~::: :::sm::: :::e ~ survive a lOth Amendment chalienge. Section 310(b) (1) serves the 
federal interest in several ways.~it checks the drain on 
federal funds by aiding in the collection of federal taxes. The 
Senate Report observed that "registration will reduce the ability 
----"-
of noncompliant taxpayers to conceal income and property from the 
reach of the income, estate, and gift taxes." 1 S. Rep. No. 97-
494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1982) ~ it will aid the 
federal government in combatting illegal activities by destroying 
their economic base. The Senate Report observed that the 
registration requirement "may reduce the volume of readily 
5As may be expected from two 5-4 results reaching opposite 
conclusions, the distinctions are not very convincing. 
, . 
I' 
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negotiable substitutes for cash available to persons engaged in 
illegal activities." Id. 6 
Under the Hodel analysis, §310(b) (1) presents a case 
that does not fit comfortably within the decisions in either 
National League of Cities or Wyoming. Considering that both 
those cases were 5-4 decisions reaching opposite results, the 
distinctions between them are not suprisingly unconvincing. The 
Wyoming decision interpreted National League of Cities as 
protecting the states only against those federal intrusions that 
might threaten their "separate and independent existence." In 
light of this narrow reading of National League of Cities, and 
the fact that §310(b) (1) theoretically does not require that the 
states issue only fully registered municipal bonds, I do not 
believe that that provision violates the lOth Amendment. To the 
extent that this case differs factually from both National League 
of Cities and Wyoming, it presents another opportunity to do 
battle over that much embattled amendment. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As to the jurisdictional issue, I recommend that the 
Court either exercise its original jurisdiction under the Anti-
injunction Act on the ground that Congress may not limit this 
Court's original jurisdiction, or that the Court hold that 
6Attacking the economic base of illegal activity is the primary 
thrust of the RICO statute. 
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application of the Act in this case denies due process. If the 
Court chooses the latter course it should not exercise its 
original jurisdiction absent a determination that the delay in 
the lower courts would be intolerable to the state bond market. 
If the Court chooses the former course, or if it finds that delay 
would be intolerable under the latter course, it could appoint a 
special master to consider the practical effects of the contested 
regulation on the state's power to borrow money. However, I 
believe that even assuming the accuracy of South Carolina's dire 
projections, the regulation does not violate the lOth Amendment 
under the standards articulated by Hodel and applied in Wyoming. 
~ '. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, PLAINTIFF v. DON-
ALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT 
No. 94, Orig. Decided December-, 1983 
JuSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
South Carolina invokes the Court's original jurisdiction1 
and asks leave to file a complaint against Donald T. Regan, 
the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The 
state seeks an injunction and other relief, on the ground that 
§ 310(b)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, is constitu-
tionally invalid as violative of the Tenth Amendment and the 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
The Secretary objects to the motion on the ground that the 
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), bars this action2 
and, alternatively, that the Court should exercise its discre-
tion to deny leave to file. We are not persuaded that either 
is a ground for denying the motion, and therefore grant the 
motion for leave to file the complaint. 
I 
Section 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. ex-
empts from a taxpayer's gross income the interest ea ed on 
'U. S. Canst., Art. III, § 2; 28 U. S. C. § 1251(b). 
2 Defendant also argues that the Court may not grant decl ratory relief 
because the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, hich author-
izes "any court of the United States" to issue a declaratolJ) judgment in an 
appropriate case, excepts from its coverage most "~tio with respect to 
1 
Federal taxes." Because of our disposition of the c e, e need n'ot decide 
at this time whether we may grant declaratory reli f s ould plaintiff pre-
vail on the merits. 
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the obligations of any State. 3 In 1982, however, as part of 
TEFRA, Congress amended § 103 to restrict the types of 
bonds that qualify for the tax exemption granted by that sec-
tion. Specifically, § 310(b)(1) of TEFRA requires that cer-
tain obligations, termed "registration-required obligations," 
be issued in registered, 4 rather than bearer, form to qualify 
for the § 103(a) exemption. 5 For purposes of § 310(b)(1), 
registration-required obligations are defined broadly to in-
clude most publicly-issued obligations with maturities 
greater than one year. 6 If an obligation that is registration-
8 I.R.C. § 103(a) provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) General rule.-Gross income does not include interest on-
(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United 
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District 
of Columbia ... " 
' Temporary Regulation§ 5f.103-1 provides that: 
"An obligation is in registered form if-
(i) The obligation is registered both as to principal and any stated interest 
and transfer of the obligation may be effected only by the surrender of the 
old instrument and either the reissuance by the issuer of the old instrument 
to the new holder or the issuance by the issuer of a new instrument to the 
new holder, or 
(ii) The right to the principal of, and stated interest on, the obligation may 
be transferred only through a book entry system (as described in para-
graph (c)(2) of this section)." 47 Fed. Reg. 51362 (1982). 
5 Section 310(b)(l) provides as follows: 
"(b) OTHER OBLIGATIONS.-
(1) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE 
TAX-EXEMPT.-Section 103 (relating to interest on certain govern-
mental obligations) is amended by ... inserting after subsection (i) the 
following new subsection: 
'(j) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE TAX-
EXEMPT.-
'(1) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in subsection (a) or in any other provision of 
law shall be construed to provide an exemption from federal income tax for 
interest on any registration-required obligation unless the obligation is in 
registered form." 
6 Section 310(b)(1) defines a registration-required obligation as any ob-
ligation other than an obligation that "(A) is not of a type offered to the 
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required is issued in bearer, rather than registered, form, 
then § 310(b)(1) provides that the interest on that obligation 
is taxable. 
Because the imposition of a tax on bearer obligations would 
require a State to pay its bondholders a higher rate of inter-
est if it issues bearer bonds, South Carolina argues that the 
practical effect of§ 310(b)(1) is to require it to issue its obliga-
tions in registered form. For that reason, South Carolina 
argues that the section destroys its freedom to issue obliga-
tions in the form that it chooses. Viewing its borrowing 
power as essential to the maintainence of its separate and in-
dependent existence, South Carolina contends that the condi-
tion imposed by§ 310(b)(l) on the exercise of that power vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. In addition, relying on Pollock 
v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (1895), 
South Carolina argues that Congress may not tax the inter-
est earned on the obligations of a state. Because § 310(b)(1) 
imposes a tax on the interest earned on state obligations is-
sued in bearer form, the State argues that the section is un-
constitutional. Accordingly, South Carolina asks that its 
motion to file the complaint be granted and that this Court 
award declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief. 7 
The Secretary does not address the merits of the State's 
constitutional claims. Rather, he argues that we may not 
grant the motion to file because this action is barred by the 
Anti-Injunction Act (Act). The Act provides, in pertinent 
part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court 
by any person, whether or not such person is the person 
public, (B) has a maturity (at issue) of not more than 1 year, or (C) is de-
scribed in section 163(f)(2)(B)." 
7 Since we have decided to appoint a Special Master to develop a factual 
record , see infra, at -, we express no opinion on the merits of the 
State's claims. 
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against whom such tax was assessed." 8 Characterizing this 
action as a suit to "restrain[] the assessment or collection of" 
a tax, the Secretary contends that this suit is barred by the 
statute. The Secretary argues that Enochs v. Williams 
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962) establishes the 
single judicially-created exception to the Act and that the in-
stant action does not fall within that exception. We need not 
address whether the instant case falls within the Williams 
Packing exception for we hold that the Act was not intended 
to bar an action where, as here, Congress has not provided 
the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to challenge the va-
lidity of a tax. 9 
II 
When enacted in 1867, the forerunner of the current Anti-
Injunction Act provided that "no suit for the purpose of re-
straining the assessment or collection of tax shall be main-
tained in any court." Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 14 Stat. 475. 10 
Although the Act apparently has no recorded legislative his-
tory, Bob Jones, supra, at 736, the circumstances of its en-
actment strongly suggest that Congress intended the Act to 
bar a suit only in situations in which Congress had provided 
the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by 
which to contest the legality of a particular tax. For the Act 
originated as an amendment to a statute that provided that 
8 The full text of the Act reads: 
"Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c), 
7426(a) and (b) (1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any 
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax 
was assessed." I.R.C. § 7421(a). 
None of the statutory exceptions is relevant in this case. 
9 Because of our disposition of the statutory issue, we need not reach the 
state's contention that application of the Act to bar this suit would uncon-
stitutionally restrict this Court's original jurisdiction. 
'
0 In the revised statutes, the term "any" was added so that the statute 
read: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of 
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 
189, 192 (1883). This language appears in the current version of the Act. 
,, . " 
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"No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recov-
ery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or ille-
gally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been 
duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue . . . 
and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon, 
unless such suit shall be brought within six months from 
the time of said decision ... " Internal Revenue Act of 
July 13th, 1866, § 19, 14 Stat. 152. 
The Anti-Injunction Act amended this statute by adding 
the Pt;fibition against injunctions. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 
14 Stat. 475. The Act, therefore, prohibited injunctions in 
the context of a statutory scheme that provided an alterna-
tive remedy. As we explained in Snyder v. Marks, 109 
U. S. 189, 193 (1883), "[t]he remedy of a suit to recover back 
the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to 
restrain its collection is forbidden." This is cogent evidence 
that the 1867 amendment was merely intended to require 
taxpayers to litigate their claims in a designated proceeding. 
The Secretary argues that, regardless of whether other 
remedies are available, a plaintiff may only sue to restrain 
the collection of taxes if it satisfies the narrow exception to 
the Act enunciated in Williams Packing, supra. Williams 
Packing did not, however, ever address, let alone decide, the 
question whether the Act applies when Congress has pro-
vided no alternative remedy. Indeed, as we shall see, a 
careful reading of Williams Packing and its progeny sup-
ports our conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply in 
the absence of such a remedy. 
Williams Packing was a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the Dis-
trict Director of the Internal Revenue Service from collecting 
allegedly past-due social security and unemployment taxes. 
The Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act would not 
apply if the taxpayer (1) was certain to succeed on the merits, 
and (2) could demonstrate that collection would cause him ir-
reparable harm. 370 U. S., at 6-7. Finding that the first 
condition had not been met, the Court concluded that the Act 
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barred the suit. Significantly, however, Congress had pro-
vided the plaintiff in Williams Packing with the alternative 
remedy of a suit for a refund. I d., at 7. 
In each of this Court's subsequent cases that have applied 
the Williams Packing rule, the plaintiff had the option of 
paying the tax and bringing a suit for a refund. Moreover, 
these cases make clear that the Court in Williams Packing 
and its progeny did not intend to decide whether the Act 
would apply to an aggrieved party who could not bring a suit 
for a refund. 
For example, in Bob Jones, supra, the taxpayer sought to 
prevent the Service from revoking its tax-exempt status 
under I.R.C. §501(c)(3). Because the suit would have re-
strained the collection of income taxes from the taxpayer and 
its contributors, as well as the collection of federal social se-
curity and unemployment taxes from the taxpayer, the Court 
concluded that the suit was an action to restrain "the assess-
ment or collection of any tax" within the meaning of the Anti-
Injunction Act. 416 U. S., at 738--739. Applying the Wil-
liams Packing test, the Court found that the Act barred the 
suit because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that it was 
certain to succeed on the merits. Id. at 749. In rejecting 
the taxpayer's challenge to the Act on due process grounds, 
however, the Court relied on the availability of a refund suit, 
noting that "our conclusion might well be different" if the ag-
grieved party had no access to judicial review. 416 U. S., at 
746. Similarly, the Court left open the question whether the 
Due Process Clause would be satisfied if an organization had 
to rely on a "friendly donor" to obtain judicial review of the 
Service's revocation of its tax-exemption. Id., at 747 n. 21. 11 
In addition, in Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 
416 U. S. 752 (1973), decided the same day as Bob Jones, the 
Court considered a taxpayer's action to require the Service to 
11 A "friendly donor" suit is a suit in which a donor claims that his con-
tributions to an organization should be tax deductible because the organiza-
tion's tax-exempt status had been revoked improperly. 
No. 94, Orig.-Opinion 
SOUTH CAROLINA v. REGAN 7 
reinstate its tax-exempt status. 12 The Court applied the 
Williams Packing test and held that the action was barred 
by the Act. Finally, in United States v. American Friends 
Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7 (1974) (per curiam), the tax-
payers sought to enjoin the Government from requiring that 
a portion of their wages be withheld. The taxpayers argued 
that the withholding provisions violated their First Amend-
ment right to bear witness to their religious beliefs. The 
Court again applied the Williams Packing rule and found 
that the suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. In both 
of these cases, the taxpayers argued that the Williams Pack-
ing test was irrelevant and the Act inapplicable because they 
did not have adequate alternative remedies. In rejecting 
this argument, the Court expressly relied on the availability 
of refund suits. 416 U. S., at 761; 419 U. S., at 11. This 
emphasis on alternative remedies would have been irrelevant 
had the Court meant to decide that the Act applied in the ab-
sence of such remedies. We therefore turn to that question. 
The analysis in Williams Packing and its progeny of the 
purposes of the Act provides significant support for our hold-
ing today. Williams Packing expressly stated that the Act 
was intended to protect tax revenues from judicial interfer-
ence "and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums 
be determined in a suit for a refund." 370 U. S., at 7 (em-
phasis added). Similarly, the Court concluded that the Act 
was also designed as "protection of the collector from litiga-
tion pending a suit for a refund," id. at 7-8 (emphasis 
added). The Court's concerns with protecting the expe-
ditious collection of revenue and protecting the collector from 
12 In Americans United, the IRS had revoked the organization's 
§ 501(c)(3) status, but found that it was eligible for § 501(c)(4) status. Al-
though the organization's income remained tax exempt, "the effect of this 
change in status was to render respondent liable for unemployment 
(FUTA) taxes under the Code § 3301, 26 U. S. C. § 3301, and to destroy its 
eligibility for tax deductible contributions under § 170." I d. at 755 (foot-
note omitted). 
,I 
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litigation were expressed in the context of a procedure that 
afforded the taxpayer the remedy of a refund suit. 
Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the 1966 amend-
ment to the Anti-Injunction Act. In 1966, in § 110(c) of the 
Federal Tax Lien Act, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125, 
Congress amended the Anti-Injunction Act to read, in perti-
nent part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the as-
sessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court, by any person whether or not such person is the per-
son against whom such tax was assessed." I d., § 110(c), 80 
Stat. 1144. The central focus of the added phrase, "by any 
person whether or not such person is the person against 
whom such tax was assessed," was on third parties whose 
property rights competed with federal tax liens. Bob Jones, 
supra, at 732 n. 6. Prior to the adoption of the Tax Lien 
Act, such parties were often unable to protect their property 
interests. I d.; H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
27-28 (1966). 13 Section 110(a) of the Tax Lien Act gave such 
third parties a right of action against the United States. 14 
The amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act was largely de-
signed to insure that the right of action granted by § 110(a) of 
the Federal Tax Lien Act was exclusive. 416 U. S., at 732 
n. 6. The language added to the Anti-Injunction Act by the 
13 Any dicta in Bob Jones suggesting that the Anti-Injunction Act barred 
such third-party suits may be disregarded. 416 U. S., at 732 n. 6. The 
Act had been widely construed not to apply to actions by third parties 
claiming that a federal tax lien impaired their property rights. See, e. g., 
Campbell v. Bagley, 276 F. 2d 28 (CA5 1960); Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F. 
2d 808 (CA71942); American Bar Association, Final Report of the Commit-
tee on Federal Liens, at 48, 116, reprinted in Hearings before the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means on H. R. 11256 and H. R. 11290, House of Repre-
sentatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
14 Section 110(a) provides in pertinent part: 
"If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant to 
a levy, any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax 
out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such prop-
erty and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil 
action against the United States in a district court of the United States." 
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1966 amendment is, therefore, simply irrelevant to the issue 
before us today. 15 
In sum, the Act's purpose and the circumstances of its en-
actment indicate that Congress merely intended the Act to 
limit aggrieved parties to specified remedies. The Act can-
not, of course, serve this purpose when Congress has pro-
vided no alternative remedy. We conclude, therefore, that 
the Act does not apply to actions brought by aggrieved par-
ties for whom Congress has not provided an alternative 
forum in which to litigate their claims. 16 In this case, if the 
16 In Bob Jones, we held that the 1966 amendment did not merely limit 
the remedies of third parties challenging federal tax liens. Rather, the 
amendment was also intended as a reaffirmation of the plain language of 
the Act. Ibid. In that sense, we found the statute to be "declaratory" 
rather than "innovative." Ibid. Because the Act, as originally enacted, 
did not cover third parties who were not given an alternative action in 
which to press their claims, our construction of the 1966 amendment in Bob 
Jones is entirely consistent with our holding today. 
Similarly, we stated in Americans United that "a suit to enjoin the assess-
ment or collection of anyone's taxes triggers the literal terms" of the Act. 
416 U. S., at 760. Of course, this statement was meant to apply only if the 
aggrieved party has an alternative remedy. 
16 As the Secretary notes, I.R.C. § 7478 does not provide plaintiff with 
an action in which he may contest the constitutionality of§ 310(b)(1). That 
section permits the Tax Court to, "make a declaration whether ... pro-
spective obligations are described in section 103(a)." The issue in this case 
involves the constitutionality of section 310(b)(1), not whether the bonds 
that the State desires to issue are "described in section 103." Therefore, 
section 7478 does not provide the State with an alternative procedure to • 
contest the legality of section 310(b)(l). 
We are aware that there are statements in the legislative history of I.R.C. 
§ 7478, indicating that Congress believed that, prior to the enactment of 
that section, prospective issuers had no means to determine whether the 
interest on their bonds would be tax exempt. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1263, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1978) (noting that, as a practical matter, state 
and local governments could not appeal from an adverse private letter rul-
ing on the taxability of a proposed issue). To the extent that these state-
ments may be read as expressing the view that the Anti-Injunction Act 
would bar suits by prospective issuers regardless of the availablility of an 
alternative remedy, they are the views of a subsequent Congress and 
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plaintiff South Carolina issues bearer bonds, its bondholders 
will, by virtue of§ 310(b)(l) of TEFRA, be liable for the tax 
on the interest earned on those bonds. South Carolina will 
incur no tax liability. Under these circumstances, the State 
will be unable to utilize any statutory procedure to contest 
the constitutionality of § 310(b)(l). Accordingly, the Act 
cannot bar this action. 
The Secretary suggests that the State may obtain judicial 
review of its claims by issuing bearer bonds and urging a pur-
chaser of those bonds to bring a suit contesting the legality of 
§ 310(b)(l). But the nature of this proposed remedy only 
buttresses our conclusion that the Act was not intended to 
apply to this kind of action. First, instances in which a third 
party may raise the constitutional rights of another are the 
exception rather than the rule. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U. S. 106, 114 (1975). More important, to make use of this 
remedy the State "must first be able to find [an individual] 
willing to subject himself to the rigors of litigation against the 
Service, and then must rely on [him] to present the relevant 
arguments on [its] behalf." Bob Jones, supra, at 747 n. 21. 
Because it is by no means certain that the State would be 
able to convince a taxpayer to raise its claims, 17 reliance on 
the remedy suggested by the Secretary would create the risk 
that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirely deprive the State 
of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims. For these 
reasons, we should not lightly attribute to Congress an intent 
to require plaintiff to find a third party to contest its claims. 
Here, the indicia of congressional intent-the Act's purposes 
therefore, at best, "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 
447 U. S. 102, 117 (1979), quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 
313 (1960). Whatever weight these statements may be entitled to, they 
are ultimately unpersuasive in light of the other evidence of congressional 
intent discussed above. 
17 It is not irrelevant that the IRS routinely audits the returns of taxpay-
ers who litigate claims for refunds. Department of the Treasury, Chief 
Counsel's Directives Manual (35)(17)50. 
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and the circumstances of its enactment-demonstrate that 
Congress did not intend the Act to apply where an aggrieved 
party would be required to depend on the mere possibility of 
persuading a third party to assert his claims. Rather, the 
Act was intended to apply only when Congress has provided 
an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its 
claims on its own behalf. Because Congress did not pre-
scribe an alternative remedy for the plaintiff in this case, the 
Act does not bar this suit. 
III 
The Secretary argues that if we conclude that the Anti-In-
junction Act is not a bar to this suit, we should in any event 
exercise our discretion to deny leave to file. He notes that 
the Court's jurisdiction over this suit is not exclusive and that 
the Court exercises its "original jurisdiction sparingly and [is] 
particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the 
plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his 
claim." United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 (1972) 
(per curiam). The State has, however, alleged that the 
application of § 310(b)(1) will "materially interfere with and 
infringe upon the authority of South Carolina to borrow 
funds." Motion for Leave to File Complaint, p. 7; see supra, 
at--. Additionally, twenty-three States have jointly sub-
mitted an amicus brief urging this Court to grant the motion 
to file. Unquestionably, the manner in which a State may 
exercise its borrowing power is a question that is of vital im-
portance to all fifty States. Under these circumstances, we 
believe that it is appropriate for us to exercise its discretion 
in favor of hearing this case. At present, however, the 
record is not sufficiently developed to permit us to address 
the merits. We shall therefore appoint a Special Master to 
develop the record. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a complaint 
is granted and a Special Master will be appointed. 
It is so ordered. 
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STATES 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, PLAINTIFF v. DON-
ALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT 
No. 94, Orig. Decided December-, 1983 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
South Carolina invokes the Court's original jurisdiction1 
and asks h:iave to file a complaint against Donald T. Regan, 
the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The 
state seeks an injunction and other relief, on the ground that 
§ 310(b)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, is constitu-
tionally invalid as violative of the Tenth Amendment and the 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
The Secretary objects to the motion on the ground that the 
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), bars this action2 
and, alternatively, that the Court should exercise its discre-
tion to deny leave to file. We are not persuaded that either 
is a ground for denying the motion, and therefore grant the 
motion for leave to file the complaint. ---
I 
Section 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) ex-
empts from a taxpayer's gross income the interest earned on 
'U. S. Canst. , Art. III , § 2; 28 U. S. C. § 1251(b). 
2 Defendant also argues that the Court may not grant declaratory relief 
because the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201 , which author-
izes "any court of the United States" to issue a declaratory judgment in an 
appropriate case, excepts from its coverage most "actions with respect to 
Federal taxes." Because of our disposition of the case, we need not decide 
at this time whether we may grant declaratory relief should plaintiff pre-
vail on the merits. 
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the obligations of any State.3 In 1982, however, as part of 
TEFRA, Congress amended § 103 to restrict the types of 
bonds that qualify for the tax exemption granted by that sec-
tion. pecifically, § 310(b)(l) of TEFRA requires that cer-
tain obligations, termed "registration-required obligations," 
be issued in registered, 4 rather than bearer, form to qualify 
for the § 103(a) exemption. 5 For purposes of § 310(b)(l), 
registration-required obligations are defined broadly to in-
clude most publicly-issued obligations with maturities 
greater than one year. 6 If an obligation that is registration-
• I.R.C. § 103(a) provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) General rule.-Gross income does not include interest on-
(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United 
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District 
of Columbia ... " 
'Temporary Regulation § 5f.103-1 provides that: 
"An obligation is in registered form if-
(i) The obligation is registered both as to principal and any stated interest 
and transfer of the obligation may be effected only by the surrender of the 
old instrument and either the reissuance by the issuer of the old instrument 
to the new holder or the issuance by the issuer of a new instrument to the 
new holder, or 
(ii) The right to the principal of, and stated interest on, the obligation may 
be transferred only through a book entry system (as described in para-
graph (c)(2) of this section)." 47 Fed. Reg. 51362 (1982). 
• Section 310(b)(1) provides as follows: 
"(b) OTHER OBLIGATIONS.-
(1) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE 
TAX-EXEMPT.-Section 103 (relating to interest on certain govern-
mental obligations) is amended by ... inserting after subsection (i) the 
following new subsection: 
'(j) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE TAX-
EXEMPT.-
'(1) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in subsection (a) or in any other provision of 
law shall be construed to provide an exemption from federal income tax for 
interest on any registration-required obligation unless the obligation is in 
registered form." 
• Section 310(b)(1) defines a registration-required obligation as any ob-
ligation other than an obligation that "(A) is not of a type offered to the 
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required is issued in bearer, rather than registered, form, 
then § 310(b)(1) provides that the interest on that obligation 
is taxable. 
Because the im.Qosition ~x on bearer obligations would 
require a State to pay its bondholders a higher rate of inter-
e~ it issues bearer-bonds, South Carolina argues that the 
practical effect of§ 310(b)(l) is to require it to issue its obliga-
tions in registered form. For tnatreason, South Carolina 
argues that the section destroys its freedom to issue obliga-
tions in the form that it chooses. Viewing its borrowing 
power as essential to the maintainence of its separate and in-
dependent existence, South Carolina contends that the condi-
tion imposed by § 310(b)(1) on the exercise of that power vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. In addition, relying on Pollock 
v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (1895), 
South Carolina argues that Congress may not tax the inter-
est earned on the obligations of a state. Because § 310(b)(1) 
imposes a tax on the interest earned on state obligations is-
sued in bearer form, the State argues that the section is un-
constitutional. Accordingly, South Carolina asks that its 
motion to file the complaint be granted and that this Court 
award declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief. 7 
The Secretary does not address the merits of the State's 
constitutional claiiii8.' Rather, he argues that we may not 
grant flie motion to file because this action is barred by the 
Anti-Injunction Act (Act). The Act provides, in pertinent 
part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court 
by any person, whether or not such person is the person 
public, (B) has a maturity (at issue) of not more than 1 year, or (C) is de-
scribed in section 163(f)(2)(B)." 
7 Since we have decided to appoint a Special Master to develop a factual 
record, see infra, at - , we express no opinion on the merits of the 
State's claims. 
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against whom such tax was assessed." 8 Characterizing this 
action as a suit to "restrain[] the assessment or collection of" 
a tax, the Secretary contends that this suit is barred by the 
statute. The Secretary argues that Enochs v. Williams 
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962) establishes the 
single judicially-created exception to the Act and that the in-
stant action does not fall within that exception. We need not 
address whether the instant case falls within the Williams 
Packing exception for we hold that the Act was not intended 
to bar an action wher~ere, Congressjias not provided 
the plamtii'f with an a1ternative legal way tOCiiallenge the va-
lidity of a tttx. s - -
II 
When enacted in 1867, the forerunner of the current Anti-
Injunction Act provided that "no suit for the purpose of re-
straining the assessment or collection of tax shall be main-
tained in any court." ActofMar. 2,1867, §10, 14Stat. 475. 10 
Although the Act apparently has no recorded legislative his-
tory, Bob Jones, supra, at 736, the circumstances of its en-
actment strongly suggest that Congress intended the Act to 
bar a suit only in situations in which Congress had provided 
the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by 
which to contest the legality of a particular tax. For the Act 
originated as an amendment to a statute that provided that 
8 The full text of the Act reads: 
"Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c), 
7426(a) and (b) (1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any 
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax 
was assessed." I.R.C. § 7421(a). 
None of the statutory exceptions is relevant in this case. 
9 Because of our disposition of the statutory issue, we need not reach the 
state's contention that application of the Act to bar this suit would uncon-
stitutionally restrict this Court's original jurisdiction. 
'
0 In the revised statutes, the term "any" was added so that the statute 
read: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of 
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Snyder v. Marks , 109 U. S. 
189, 192 (1883). This language appears in the current version of the Act. 
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"No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recov-
ery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or ille-
gally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been 
duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue ... 
and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon, 
unless such suit shall be brought within six months from 
the time of said decision ... " Internal Revenue Act of 
July 13th, 1866, § 19, 14 Stat. 152. 
The Anti-Injunction Act amended this statute by adding 
the prhioihon agaillsi InJUnctions. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 
14 ~ The Act, therefore, prohibited injunctions in 
the context of a statutory scheme that provided an alterna-
tive remedy. As we explained in Snyder v. Marks, 109 
U. S. 189, 193 (1883), "[t]he remedy of a suit to recover back 
the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to 
restrain its collection is forbidden." This is cogent evidence J 
that the 1867 amendment was merely intended to re uire 
taxpayers o 1 1gate their claims m a esi ated roceeding. 
e ecretary argues that, regar ess of whether other 
remedies are available, a plaintiff may only sue to restrain 
the collection of taxes if it satisfies the narrow exception to 
the Act enunciated in Williams Packing, supra. Williams 
Packing did not, however, ever address, let alone decide, the 
question whether the Act applies when Congress has pro-
vided no alternative remedy. Indeed, as we shall see, a 
careful reading of Williams Packing and its progeny sup-
ports our conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply in 
the absence of such a remedy. 
Williams Packing was a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the Dis-
trict Director of the Internal Revenue Service from collecting 
allegedly past-due social security and unemployment taxes. 
The Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act would not 
apply if the taxpayer (1) was certain to succeed on the merits, 
and (2) could demonstrate that collection would cause him ir-
reparable harm. 370 U. S., at ~7. Finding that the first 
condition had not been met, the Court concluded that the Act 
,, ' 
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barred the suit. Significantly, however, Congress had pro-
vided the plaintiff in Williams Packing with the alternative 
remedy of a suit for a refund. /d., at 7. 
"""ileach of this Court's subsequent cases that have applied 
the Williams Packing rule, the plaintiff had the option of 
paying the tax and bringing a suit for a refund. Moreover, 
these cases make clear that the Court in Williams Packing 
and its progeny did not intend to decide whether the Act 
would apply to an aggrieved party who could not bring a suit 
for a refund. 
For example, ir(B}b Jones} supra, the taxpayer sought to 
prevent the Service from revoking its tax-exempt status 
under I.R.C. §501(c)(3). Because the suit would have re-
strained the collection of income taxes from the taxpayer and 
its contributors, as well as the collection of federal social se-
curity and unemployment taxes from the taxpayer, the Court 
concluded that the suit was an action to restrain "the assess-
ment or collection of any tax" within the meaning of the Anti-
Injunction Act. 416 U. S., at 738-739. Applying the Wil-
liams Packing test, the Court found that the Act barred the 
suit because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that it was 
certain to succeed on the merits. Id. at 749. In rejecting 
the taxpayer's challenge to the Act on due process grounds, 
however, the Court relied on the availability of a refund suit, 
noting that "our conclusiOn might well be different" if the ag-
grieved party had no access to judicial review. 416 U. S., at 
746. Similarly, the Court left open the question whether the 
Due Process Clause would be satisfied if an organization had 
to rely on a "friendly donor" to obtain judicial review of the 
Service's revocation of its tax-exemption. /d., at 747 n. 2 .n 
In addition, in Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 
416 U. S. 752 (1973), decided the same day as Bob Jones, the 
Court considered a taxpayer's action to require the Service to 
11 A "friendly donor" suit is a suit in which a donor claims that his con-
tributions to an organization should be tax deductible because the organiza-
tion's tax-exempt status had been revoked improperly. 
. . 
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reinstate its tax-exempt status. 12 The Court applied the 
Williams Packing test and held that the action was barred 
by the Act. Finally, in United States v. American Friends 
Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7 (1974) (per curiam), the tax-
payers sought to enjoin the Government from requiring that 
a portion of their wages be withheld. The taxpayers argued 
that the withholding provisions violated their First Amend-
ment right to bear witness to their religious beliefs. The 
Court again applied the Williams Packing rule and found 
that the suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. In both 
oft._hese cases, the t~payers argued that the Williams PaCk-
ing test was irrelevant anaffie :Act inapplicable because they 
did ~ate alternative remedies. In rejecting 
this argumen , e ou xpress y re 1ed on the availability 
of refund suits. 416 U. S., at 761; 419 U. S., at 11. This 
emphasis on alternative remedies would have been irrelevant 
had the Court meant to decide that the Act applied in the ab-
sence of such remedies. We therefore turn to that question. 
The analysis in Williams Packing and its progeny of the 
purposes of the Act provides significant support for our hold-
ing today. Williams Packing expressly stated that the Act 
was intended to protect tax revenues from judicial interfer-
ence "and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums 
be determined in a suit for a refund." 370 U. S., at 7 (em-
phasis added). Similarly, the Court concluded that the Act 
was also designed as "protection of the collector from litiga-
tion pending a suit for a refund," id. at 7-8 (emphasis 
added). The Court's concerns with protecting the expe-
ditious collection of revenue and protecting the collector from 
12 In Americans United, the IRS had revoked the organization's 
§ 501(c)(3) status, but found that it was eligible for § 501(c)(4) status. Al-
though the organization's income remained tax exempt, "the effect of this 
change in status was to render respondent liable for unemployment 
(FUTA) taxes under the Code§ 3301, 26 U. S. C. § 3301, and to destroy its 
eligibility for tax deductible contributions under § 170." I d. at 755 (foot-
note omitted) . 
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litigation were expressed in the context of a procedure that 
afforded the taxpayer the remedy of a refund suit. 
Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the 1966 amend-
ment to theAlltl-In] unctfon Act-:--' In 196~in § 110(c) of the 
Federal Tax Lie'iiA:ct , PUb. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125, 
Congress amended the Anti-Injunction Act to read, in perti-
nent part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the as-
sessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court, by any person whether or not such person is the per-
son against whom such tax was assessed." Id., § 110(c), 80 
Stat. 1144. The central focus of the added phrase, "by any 
person whether or not such person 1s the person against 
whom such tax was assessed," was on third parties whose 
property rights competed with federal tax liens. Bob Jones, 
supra, at 2 n. . rwr o e a op Ion of the Tax Lien 
Act, such parties were often unable to protect their property 
interests. I d.; H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
27-28 (1966). 13 Section 110(a) of the Tax Lien Act gave such 
third parties a right of action against the United States. 14 
The amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act was largely de-
sigr;ed !.2_ ins~11!!f ~~ r igilt of act~on granted 6y § 110(a) of 
the Federal Tax Lien ACt was exc1usive. 416 U. S., at 732 
n. 6. The language added to the Anti-Injunction Act by the 
13 Any dicta in Bob Jones suggesting that the Anti-Injunction Act barred 
such third-party suits may be disregarded. 416 U. S., at 732 n. 6. The 
Act had been widel construed not to apply to actions b third arties 
clmmm that a ederal tax lien impaire t eir propert rights. See, e. g., 
Campbe v. agley, 276 F. 2d 28 ( A 1960); Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F. 
2d 808 (CA 7 1942); American Bar Association, Final Report of the Commit-
tee on Federal Liens, at 48, 116, reprinted in Hearings before the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means on H. R. 11256 and H. R. 11290, House of Repre-
sentatives, 89th Cong. , 2d Sess. (1966). 
14 Section 110(a) provides in pertinent part: 
"If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant to 
a levy, any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax 
out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such prop-
erty and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil 
action against the United States in a district court of the United States." 
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1966 amendment is, therefore, simply irrelevant to the issue 
before us today.'5 
In sum, the Act's purpose and the circumstances of its en-
actment indicate that Congress merely intended the Act to 
limit aggrieved parties to specifiedremeoies. The Act can-
no , o course, serve IS purP. e en Congress has pro-
vided no alternative remedy. e conclud therefore, that 
the Act does not apply to actions brought by aggrieved par-
ties ... for w1iom Congress has not provided an alternative 
foru n t is case, if the 
'"In Bob Jones, we held that the 1966 amendment did not merely limit 
the remedies of third parties challenging federal tax liens. Rather, the 
amendment was also intended as a reaffirmation of the plain language of 
the Act. Ibid. In that sense, we found the statute to be "declaratory" 
rather than "innovative." Ibid. Because the Act, as originally enacted, 
did not cover third parties who were not given an alternative action in 
which to press their claims, our construction of the 1966 amendment in Bob 
Jones is entirely consistent with our holding today. 
Similarly, we stated in Americans United that "a suit to enjoin the assess-
ment or collection of anyone's taxes triggers the literal terms" of the Act. 
416 U. S., at 760. Of course, this statement was meant to apply only if the 
aggrieved party has an alternative remedy. 
16 As the Secretary notes, I.R.C. § 7478 does not provide plaintiff with 
an action in which he may contest the constitutionality of§ 310(b)(l). That 
section permits the Tax Court to, "make a declaration whether . . . pro-
spective obligations are described in section 103(a)." The issue in this case 
involves the constitutionality of section 310(b)(1), not whether the bonds 
that the State desires to issue are "described in section 103." Therefore, 
section 7478 does not provide the State with an alternative procedure to 
contest the legality of section 310(b)(1). 
We are aware that there are statements in the legislative history of I.R.C. 
§ 7478, indicating that Congress believed that, prior to the enactment of 
that section, prospective issuers had no means to determine whether the 
interest on their bonds would be tax exempt. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1263, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1978) (noting that, as a practical matter, state 
and local governments could not appeal from an adverse private letter rul-
ing on the taxability of a proposed issue). To the extent that these state-
ments may be read as expressing the view that the Anti-Injunction Act 
would bar suits by prospective issuers regardless of the availablility of an 
alternative remedy, they are the views of a subsequent Congress and 
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plaintiff South Carolina issues bearer bonds, its bondholders 
will, by virtue of§ 310(b)(l) of TEFRA, be liable for the tax 
on the interest earned on those bonds. South Carolina will 
incur no tax liability. Under these circumstances, the State 
will be unable to utilize any statutory procedure to contest 
the constitutionality of § 310(b)(l). Accordingly, the Act 
cannot bar this action. 
The Secretary suggests that the State may obtain judicial 
review of its claims by issuing bearer bonds and urging a pur-
chaser of those bonds to bring a suit contesting the legality of 
§ 310(b)(1). But the nature of this proposed remedy only 
buttresses our conclusion that the Act was not intended to 
apply to this kind of action. First, instances in which a third 
party may raise the constitutional rights of another are the 
exception rather than the rule. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U. S. 106, 114 (1975). More important, to make use of this 
remedy the State "must first be able to find [an individual] 
willing to subject himself to the rigors of litigation against the 
Service, and then must rely on [him] to present the relevant 
arguments on [its] behalf." Bob Jones, supra, at 747 n. 21. 
Because it is by no means certain that the State would be 
able to convince a taxpayer to raise its claims, 17 reliance on 
the remedy suggested by the Secretary would create the risk 
that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirely deprive the State 
of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims. For these 
reasons, we should not lightly attribute to Congress an intent 
to require plaintiff to find a third party to contest its claims. 
Here, the indicia of congressional intent-the Act's purposes 
therefore, at best, "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 
447 U. S. 102, 117 (1979), quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 
313 (1960). Whatever weight these statements may be entitled to, they 
are ultimately unpersuasive in light of the other evidence of congressional 
intent discussed above. 
17 It is not irrelevant that the IRS routinely audits the returns of taxpay-
ers who litigate claims for refunds. Department of the Treasury, Chief 
Counsel's Directives Manual (35)(17)50. 
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and the circumstances of its enactment-demonstrate that 
Congress did not intend the Act to apply where an aggrieved 
party would be required to depend on the mere possibility of 
persuading a third party to assert his claims. Rather, the 
Act was intended to apply only when Congress has provided 
an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its 
claims on its own behalf. Because Congress did not pre-
scribe an alternative remedy for the plaintiff in this case, the 
Act does not bar this suit. 
III 
The Secretary argues that if we conclude that the Anti-In-
junction Act is not a bar to this suit, we should in any event 
exercise our discretion to deny leave to file. He notes that 
the Court's jurisdiction over this suit is not exclusive and that 
the Court exercises its "original jurisdiction sparingly and [is] 
particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the 
plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his 
claim." United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 (1972) 
(per curiam). The State has, however, alleged that the 
application of § 310(b)(1) will "materially interfere with and 
infringe upon the authority of South Carolina to borrow 
funds." Motion for Leave to File Complaint, p. 7; see supra, 
at--. Additionally, twenty-three States have jointly sub-
mitted an amicus brief urging this Court to grant the motion 
to file. Unquestionably, the manner in which a State may 
exercise its borrowing power is a question that is of vital im-
portance to all fifty States. Under these circumstances, we 
believe that it is appropriate for us to exercise its discretion 
in favor of hearing this case. At present, however, the 
record is not sufficiently developed to permit us to address 
the merits. We shall therefore appoint a Special Master to 
develop the record. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a complaint 
is granted and a Special Master will be appointed. 
It is so ordered. 
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No. 94 Orig. South Carolina v. Regan 
Dear Bill, 
I continue to be concerned about holding that the Anti-
Injunction Act is inapplicable in situations where the aggrie3ed 
parties have no otner remed1es. -rt seems to me various ~ potential 
plaint1ff:S,~s~ax e-xempt organizations, pay no direct taxes 
and cannot bring suits for refunds. Nevertheless, I had thought 
Congress made a judgment that only actual taxpayers should be 
able to litigate the propriety of a tax assessment, and that such 
(
litigation should be limited to suits for refunds. Indeed, 
Congress has previously recognized the dilemma that the Anti-
Injunction Act creates for such parties and has given relief in 
at least one instance. 
For example, in 1978, precisely because "the present 
law does not allow the state or local government to go to court," 
s. Rep. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 533 (1978), Congress 
provided that issuers of state and municipal bonds could seek 
declaratory judgments about the status of certain prospective 
obligations. lRC § 7478. It seems to me that such post-enactment 
legislative history is reliable and should help guide our 
interpretation. 
I agree with your final judgment, however, because 
Congress cannot prevent this Court from entertaining a 
constitutional challenge to a tax statute under our original 
jurisdiction. It might also be possible to hold that Congress 
did not intend the Anti-Injunction Act to apply to original 
actions brought by states in this Court. 
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Dear Bill: 
Although I will join Parts I and II of the 
opinion, I remain persuaded that we should not grant 
leave to file because there is simply no merit 
whatsoever in the State's claim. I will write this out 
as soon as I can. 
Justice Brennan 
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Dear Bill: 
In mv Jetter of December 15, T T(listak.enly saio I 
was awaiting ~ di~sent from Bill R~hnquist. 
I certainly agree with your iu~gment. My concern 
is whether we need go beyond holding that the Anti-
Jniunction Act does not limit the exercise of our original 
jnrisd;ction. 
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South Carolina v. Regan 
December 20, 1983 
I just returned to town to find your letter regarding this 
case. I appreciate your views and am looking forward to seeing 
what you come up with. At conference, a number of reasonable 
ways to reach the conclusion that the Act does not bar this suit 
were advanced. In thinking through the case, I realized that 
none of these approaches -- including the one I have proposed --
is entirely without its problems. Although I continue to believe 
that the Act was not intended to apply when there is no other 
remedy, and that a contrary interpretation would raise serious 
constitutional difficulties, it may be that your approach is a 
reasonable one that would permit us to leave that question for 
a not her day. 
I note, however, that there is one practical problem with 
holding that the Act does not apply to this Court. I am 
concerned that such a holding would invite a spate of lawsuits by 
States invoking our original jurisdiction to litigate tax 
matters. Holding that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply in 
this Court, but does apply in other courts when there is no 
alternative remedy, would be particularly troublesome. Were a 
State to file a suit in this Court claiming that it had no access 
to any other court, I would think that, at a minimum, we would be 
required to take a hard look at the issues presented before 
declining to hear the case. Indeed, in some of these cases, 
because of the absence of an alternative remedy, it would be an 
abuse of discretion for us to deny leave to file. See Maryland 
v. Louisiana, 451 u.s. 725, 740 (1980) (whether it TSappropriate 
to deny leave to file depends on the seriousness of the claim and 
the availability of another forum). 
If you can allay my concern in this regard, I do not think 
that I would be likely to take issue with a holding that the Act 
does not apply to this Court, as long as the question whether the 
Act applies in other courts in the absence of an alternative 
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congressional anti-injunction policy. Accordingly, I cannot 
join its opinion. 
I 
A 
The Tax Anti-Injunction Act provides, in pertinent part, 
that "no suit fort1ie pur-pQSe of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any C.IDirt by any 
person, whether or not such person is the- person against 
whom such tax was assessed." 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a). The 
Act's language "could scarcely be more explicit" in prohibit-
ing nontaxpayer suits like this one, Bob Jones University v. 
Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 736 (1974), since the suit indisputably 
would have the purpose and effect of restraining taxes. See 
id., at 738-742. The Act plainly bars not only "a taxpayer's 
attempt to enjoin the collection of his own taxes, ... " but 
.also "a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of anyon[e] 
[else's] taxes .... " Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 
416 U. S. 752, 760 (1974). Though the Internal Revenue 
Code (Code) contains a few exceptions to this nearly com-
plete ban, 1 for the most part Congress has restricted the ju-
dicial role to resolution of concrete disputes over specific 
sums of money, either by way of a deficiency proceeding in 
the Tax Court, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 6212, 6213, or by way of a 
taxpayer's suit for refund, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 6532, 7422. 
In depriving courts of jurisdiction to resolve abstract tax 
controversies, Congress has determined that the United 
States must be able "to assess and collect taxes alleged to be 
due without judicial intervention .... " Enochs v. Wil-
liams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1, 7 (1962). 
"[T]axes are the life-blood of government," Bull v. United 
States, 295 U. S. 247, 259 (1935), and the anti-injunction pro-
hibition is Congress' recognition that "the tenacity of the 
American taxpayer" constantly threatens to drain the nation 
of a life-sustaining infusion of revenues. See Gorovitz, Fed-
1 See infra, at,..,)ijlll!t (describing some exceptions); see also 26 U. S. C. 
§§ 6694(c), 7429(b) . 
-
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eral Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut Cases, 10 Taxes 
446, 446 (1932). The Act's proscription literally extends to 
nontaxpayer as well as taxpayer suits, if only to prevent tax-
payers from sidestepping the anti-injunction policy by bring-
ing suit through non-taxpaying associations of taxpayers. 2 
Moreover, by broadly precluding both taxpayer and nontax-
payer suits, the Act serves a collateral objective of protecting 
"the collector from litigation pending a suit for refund." 
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., supra, at 
7-8. The tax collector is an attractive target for all kinds of 
litigation, see, e. g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), and the Act en-
sures that only Congress and the Treasury, not a host of pri-
vate plaintiffs, will determine the focus of the collector's en-
ergies. 
B 
The Act's history expressly reflects the congressional de-
sire that all injunctive suits against the tax collector be pro-
hibited. First enacted in 1867,3 it apparently was designed 
to protect the federal tax system from being inundated with 
the same type of injunctive suits that were then sweeping 
over the state tax systems. See State Railroad Tax Cases, 
2 Non-taxpaying associations of taxpayers and nontaxpayer organiza-
tions previously have attempted to avoid the congressional policy against 
judicial resolution of abstract tax controversies. See, e. g., Investment 
Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F. 2d 1 (CADC 1979) (insurers seeking 
declaration that certain investment annuity contracts are eligible for favor-
able tax treatment); Educo, Inc., v. Alexander, 557 F. 2d 617 (CA7 1977) 
(company engaged in designing and administering educational benefit plans 
for corporate employees sues to protect its clients' tax benefits); Cattle 
Feeders Tax Committee v. Shultz, 504 F. 2d 462 (CAlO 1974) (unincorpo-
rated association representing participants in tax shelter cattle feed pro-
gram seeking injunction to prevent Treasury from disallowing certain 
year-end deductions); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453 n. 25 
(DC 1972) (nontaxpayer challenge to tax-exempt status of racially discrimi-
natory fraternal organization), disapproved in Bob Jones University v. Si-
mon, 416 U. S. 725, 732, and n. 6 (1974). 
8 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 14 Stat. 475. 
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92 U. S. 575, 613 (1876); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 
193-194 (1883). There is little contemporaneous documenta-
tion,4 but this Court's decisions indicate that the 39th Con-
gress acted with a: 
" ... sense of ... the evils to be feared if courts of jus-
tice could, in any case, interfere with the process of col-
lecting the taxes on which the government depends for 
its continued existence." State Railroad Tax Cases, 
supra, at 613. 
The experience in the states demonstrated the grave dangers 
which accompany intrusion of the injunctive power of the 
courts into the administration of the revenue: 
"If there existed in the courts . . . any general power 
of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or re-
lieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very exist-
ence of the government might be placed in the power of a 
hostile judiciary." Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S. 
85, 89 (1876). 
To avoid avoid these evils and to safeguard the federal tax 
system, the 39th Congress committed administration of the 
Code to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. 5 
'The Act was introduced on March 1, 1867, by Mr. Fessenden, Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Finance, as an amendment to a section 
which made a taxpayer appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a 
condition precedent to suit for the recovery of taxes. See Congressional 
Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, p. 1933 (proposing amendment to the 
Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 19, 14 Stat. 152, presently codified at 26 
U. S. C. § 6532(a)). The House initially objected to this amendment, see 
Congressional Globe, supra, p. 1949, but the Senate would not recede, id., 
at 1950. After a conference, the House agreed to the amendment. See 
id., at 1968. No other recorded legislative history has been uncovered. 
See Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes De-
spite Statutory Prohibition, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 109, and n. 9 (1935). 
6 The circumstances of the enactment do not, as the Court suggests, see 
ante, at 4-5, indicate that Congress meant to prohibit injunctions only 
where the statutory scheme provided an alternative remedy. Rather, 
"[s]ince equitable principles militating against the issuance of federal in-
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This broad anti-injunction ban remained essentially un-
touched for almost a century. 6 In 1966, however, Congress 
took steps to "reaffirm the plain meaning of the original lan-
guage of the Act." Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 
416 U. S. 752, 760, and n. 11 (1974). In§ 110(c) of the Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125, Con-
gress amended the Act to emphasize that no injunctive action 
"by any person, whether or not such person is the person 
against whom such tax was assessed" could be maintained in 
the courts. !d., § 110(c), 80 Stat. 1144 (emphasis added). 
The Treasury Department proposed the 1966 amendment, 
and its principal spokesperson, Assistant Secretary Surrey, 
testified that: 
"Subsection (c) of section 110 of the bill amends section 
7421(a) of the code. That section presently prohibits in-
junctions against the assessment or collection of tax. 
The cases decided under this provision raise a question 
as to whether this prohibition applies against actions by 
persons other than the taxpayer. New section 7426 will 
specifically allow actions by third parties to enjoin the 
enforcement of a levy or sale of property. The amend-
ment to section 7421 makes clear that third parties may 
bring injunction suits only under the circumstances pro-
vided in new section 7426(b)(1) of the code." Statement 
junctions in tax cases existed independently of the Anti-Injunction Act, it 
is most unlikely that Congress would have chosen the stringent language of 
the Act if its purpose was merely to restate existing law and not to compel 
litigants to make use solely of the avenues of review opened by Congress." 
Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra, 426 U. S., at 742-743, n. 16. 
'"Enacted in 1867, [the Anti-Injunction Act], for more than sixty years, 
[was] consistently applied as precluding relief, whatever the equities al-
leged."' ld., at 745, n. 18 (quoting Miller v. Standard Nut Margerine 
Co., 284 U. S. 498, 511 (1932) (Stone, J., dissenting)). 
• In the revised statutes, the term "any'' was added so that the statute 
read: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of 
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 
189, 192 (1883). 
6 
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by the Hon. Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury, reprinted in Hearings Before the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means on H. R. 11256 and H. R. 11290, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess."58 (1966). 
The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate 
Committee on Finance apparently shared Mr. Surrey's un-
derstanding of the rights of nontaxpayers under prior law, 
for their reports both state: 
"Under present law, ... the United States cannot be 
sued by third persons where its collection activities in-
terfere with their property rights. This includes cases 
where the Government wrongfully levies on one person's 
property in attempting to collect from a taxpayer. 
However, some courts allow suits to be brought against 
district directors of Internal Revenue where this oc-
curs." H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.A-27 
(1966); S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess."'-29 (1966). 
To accomodate these conflicting rights, both committees rec-
ommended that Congress enact § 7426, allowing "persons 
other than taxpayers" to bring suits against the United 
States to protect pre-existing liens on property levied upon 
by the Treasury, and amend § 7421(a) to forbid suits by all 
third persons, excepting those within the ambit of new 
§ 7 426. Congress followed the committees' recommenda-
tions, on the understanding that the new language in 
§ 7421(a) was "declaratory, not innovative." Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. Simon, supra, 416 U. S., at 731-732, n. 6. 7 
7 I am at a complete loss to understand the Court's assertion that the 
"language added to the Anti-Injunction Act by the 1966 amendment is ... 
simply irrelevant to the issue before us today." Ante, at 8-9. This con-
clusion follows only if the Court begins with a premise that it need pay no 
attention to either the 1966 amendment's language or its legislative his-
tory. 
Similarly, I do not believe, as the Court apparently does, see ante, at nn. 
13, 15, that statements in Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra, to the 
effect that the Act bars third-party suits, can or should be "disregarded." 
" ) 
No. 94, Orig.-CONCUR 
SOUTH CAROLINA v. REGAN 7 
Congress has since relaxed the statutory proscription 
against third-party suits on several occasions. For example, 
in 1974, it provided that certain designated persons could ob-
tain declaratory judgments in the Tax Court with respect to 
the tax status of pension plans. See 26 U. S. C. § 7476. 
Similarly, in 1976, because "[u]nder [prevailing] law no court 
review of [Internal Revenue Service] ruling[s] [was] avail-
able," S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. II, p. 463 (1976), Congress pro-
vided declaratory judgment procedures for determining the 
tax status of charitable organizations and of certain property 
transfers. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 7428, 7477; see also S. Rep. 
No. 94-938, supra, pp. 523-524 ("Under present law, the Tax 
Court can hear declaratory judgment suits only on the tax 
status of employee retirement plans. In no other case may 
an individual or an organization seek a declaratory judgment 
as to an organization's tax-exempt status."). Finally, in 
1978, in 26 U. S. C. § 7478, Congress provided a mechanism 
whereby State or local governments could seek declaratory 
judgments as to the tax status of proposed municipal bond is-
suances. 8 The relevant Senate Report noted that: 
"As a practical matter, there is no effective appeal 
from a Service private letter ruling (or failure to issue a 
private letter ruling) that a proposed issue of municipal 
bonds is taxable. In those cases, although there may be 
a real controversy between a State or local government 
Those statements were made after studious interpretation of both the orig-
inal Act and its 1966 amendment. They reflect what I believe is the only 
faithful reading of the statute's language and history. 
8 Section 7478 does not directly apply to this case because it permits the 
Tax Court only to "make a declaration whether ... prospective obligations 
are described in section 103(a)." The issue in this case involves the con-
stitutionality of § 310(b)(1), not whether the bonds South Carolina desires 
to issue are "described in section 103." Nevertheless, § 7478 demon-
strates that Congress believed that, prior to the enactment of that section, 
prospective issuers had no means to determine whether the interest on 
their bonds would be tax exempt. SeeS. Rep. No. 95-1263, pp. 150-151 
(1978). 
8 
No. 94, Orig.-CONCUR 
SOUTH CAROLINA v. REGAN 
and the Service, present law does not allow the State or 
local government to go to court. The controversy can 
be resolved only if the bonds are issued, a bondholder ex-
cludes interest on the bonds from income, the exclusion 
is disallowed, and the Service asserts a deficiency in its 
statutory notice of deficiency. This uncertainty coupled 
with the threat of the ultimate loss of the exclusion, in-
variably makes it impossible to market the bonds. In 
addition, it is impossible for a State or local government 
to question the Service rulings and regulations directly. 
"[S]tate and local government[s] should have a right to 
court adjudiciation in the situation described above. 
The bill deals with the problem by providing ... for a 
declaratory judgment as to the tax status of a proposed 
issue of municipal bonds." S. Rep. No. 95-1263, pp. 
150-151 (1978). 
The Conference Report reflects a similar view of prevailing 
law. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1800, p. 240 (1978). 
Thus, in 1974, 1976, and again in 1978, Congress expressed 
its belief that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act generally bars 
nontaxpayers from bringing the kind of injunctive action the 
State of South Carolina asks lea.ve to file today. 9 
These subsequently enacted provisions and the legislative 
understanding of them are entitled to "great weight" in con-
struing earlier, related legislation. See, e. g., Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969); 
Federal Housing Admin. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 
• Our cases make clear that the constitutional nature of a challenge to a 
tax, as distinct from its probability of success, is of no consequence under 
the Anti-Injunction Act. See Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 
U. S. 752, 759 (1974); Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 20 (1922); Dodge v. 
Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 121 (1916). Congress can be presumed to have had 
knowledge of those cases when it amended the Act in 1966 and in later 
years when it passed related legislation. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc . v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 382, and n. 66 (1982); 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). 
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84, 90 (1958). Combined with the legislative purposes obvi-
ously motivating the 39th and 89th Congresses, these provi-
sions conclusively demonstrate that, absent express exemp-
tion, the Act generally precludes judicial resolution of all 
abstract tax controversies, even if the complaining parties 
would have no other forum in which to bring their challenges. 
c 
The Court drew these same conclusions in Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. Simon. See 416 U. S. 725, 736-746. In that case, 
the Court rejected a private institution's request that an ad-
ditional exception beyond the one created in Enochs v. Wil-
liams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962) (equity 
court may issue injunction where it is clear that under no cir-
cumstances could the Government prevail), be carved out of 
the Act. 10 The Court responded that Williams Packing: 
"was meant to be the capstone to judicial construction of 
the Act. It spells an end to a cyclical pattern of alle-
giance to the plain meaning of the Act, followed by peri-
ods of uncertainty caused by the judicial departure from 
that meaning, and followed in turn by the Court's redis-
closing of the Act's purpose." 416 U. S., at 742. 
Bob Jones University then reaffirmed that, except where a 
litigant can show both that the government would "under no 
circumstances prevail" and that equity jurisdiction is other-
wise present, the Act would be given its "literal effect." I d., 
at 736, 742-745. 
Because the plaintiffs in Bob Jones University were as-
sured ultimately of having access to a judicial forum, the 
Court did not definitively resolve whether Congress could 
'
0 The Williams Packing exception is not applicable in this case. 
Though South Carolina's Tenth Amendment and intergovernmental tax 
immunity claims are serious ones, we cannot say that there are no circum-
stances under which the Government could prevail. Thus, even if§ 310(b) 
would cause the State irreparable injury, South Carolina could not rely on 
the Williams Packing exception to invoke a court's authority to review. 
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bar a tax suit in which the complaining party would be denied 
all access to judicial review. See 416 U. S., at 746. But the 
Court's reference to "a case in which an aggrieved party has 
no access at all to judicial review" came in the context of its 
discussion of the taxpayer's claim that postponement of its 
challenge to the revocation of its tax-exempt status would vi-
olate due process. Bob Jones University's dictum, there-
fore, should be interpreted only as reflecting the established 
rule that Congress cannot, consistently with due process, 
deny a taxpayer with property rights at stake all opportunity 
for an ultimate judicial determination of the legality of a tax 
assessment against him. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 
u. s. 589, 596-597 (1931). 
On this reading, Bob Jones University's recognition that 
the complete inaccessability of judicial review might impli-
cate due process concerns provides absolutely no basis for 
crafting an exception in this case. The State of South Caro-
lina is not a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 
323-324 (1966). Nor does the State assert a right cognizable 
as a "property" interest protected by that Clause. See gen-
erally Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 
430-433 (19 cata oguing cases). Therefore, it has no due 
process right to review of its claim in a judicial forum. 11 
11 Taxing measures inevitably have a pecuniary impact on nontaxpayers 
who are linked to the persons against whom a tax is imposed. This Court 
has held that the indirect impacts of a tax, no matter how detrimental, gen-
erally do not invade any interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause. 
See, e. g., Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra (indirect impacts on char-
itable organization); United States v. American Friends Service Commit-
tee, 419 U. S. 7 (1974) (per curiam) (indirect impacts on First Amendment 
interests of employees). There is no occasion here to address when, if 
ever, such indirect impacts would implicate Due Process concerns if no ju-
dicial review of the complaining party's direct tax liabilities would ulti-
mately be available. Cf. Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra, at 
747-748 (discussing powerful governmental interests); Investment Annu~ 
ity, Inc . v. Blumenthal, 609 F. 2d 1, 7-10 (CADC 1979) (indirect impact' 
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In holding that the Act does not bar suits by nontaxpayers 
with no other remedies, the Court today has created a 
"breach in the general scheme of taxation [that] gives an 
opening for the disorganization of the whole plan[.]" Allen 
v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 454 (Reed, J., concurring in the 
result). Non-taxpaying associations of taxpayers, and most 
other nontaxpayers, will now be allowed to sidestep Con-
gress~ policy against judicial resolution of abstract tax con- ~ 
troversies. They can now challenge both Congress~ tax stat- "'.:s 
utes and the Internal Revenue Service's regulations, revenue 
rulings, and private letter decisions. In doing so, they can 
impede the process of collecting federal revenues and require 
Treasury to focus its energies on questions deemed important 
not by it or Congress but by a host of private plaintiffs. The 
Court's holding travels "a long way down the road to the 
emasculation of the Anti-Injunction Act, and down the com-
panion pathway that leads to the blunting of the strict re-
quirements of Williams Packing .... " Commissioner v. 
Shapiro, 424 U. S. 614, 635 (1976) (BLACKMUN, J., dissent-
ing). I simply cannot join such a fundamental undermining 
of the congressional purpose. 
II 
The Act's language, purpose, and history should leave no \ 
doubt that Congress intended to preclude both taxpayer and 
nontaxpayer suits, regardless of the availability of an alterna-
tive forum. The Solicitor General agrees and contends that, 
since the anti-injunction proliib1tion extends to "an court;"lt 
shou e read to~ s ourt acting in its origiilafJUrisdlc-
tionas well. The Solicitor General's contention raises a 
grave constitutional question: namely, whether Congress 
constitutionally can impose remedial limitations so jurisdic-
tional in nature that they effectively withdraw the original 
jurisdiction of this Court. 
on nontaxpaying business does not implicate Due Process Clause even 
though no judicial review otherwise available). 
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A 
Under the language used in Article III of the Constitution, 
Congress relates to the courts of the United States in three 
textually different ways. 12 In it broadest textual delegation, 
that Article authorizes Congress to establish the "inferior 
Courts" and places no express limits on the congressional 
power to regulate the courts so created. See U. S. Const. 
Art. III, § 1, cl. 1. By constrast, that Article itse creates 
the Supreme Court and textuallY differentiates between on-
gress's relationship with the appellate and or 'nal 'urisdic-
tions o t a ourt. icle I express y empowers Con-
gress to make" "Exceptions" and "Regulations" to the 
appellate jurisdiction. U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. 2; Ex 
Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869) (dismissing for want of 
appellate jurisdiction). But, in what is effectively its nar-
rowest delegation, Article III is silent regarding Congress's 
authority to make exceptions to or regulations regarding 
cases in the original jurisdiction-those that affect "Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a Party." Ibid. 
12 Article III rovides, in pertinent part, that: 
"Secti;m:-y The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish .... 
"Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; ... ;-
to Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State ... . 
"In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction.~ases before mentioned, the su-
preme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, 
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make." U. S. Const., Art. III, §§ 1, 2. 
~· 
7 
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Though the original history of Article III is sparse, 13 what 
is available indicates that these textual differences were pur-
poseful on the Framers' part. The Framers obviously 
thought that the national government should have a judicial 
system of its own and that that system should have a Su-
preme Court. However, because the Framers believed the I 
State courts would be adequate for resolving most disputes, 
they generally left Congress the power of determining what 
cases, if any, should be channelled to the federal courts. The 
one textual exception to that rule concerned the original ju-
risdiction, where the Framers apparently mandated that Su-
preme Court review be available. "The evident purpose was 
to open and keep open the highest court of the nation for the 
determination, in the first instance, of suits involving a State 
or a diplomatic or commercial representative of a foreign gov-
ernment." Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 464 (1883). The 
Framers apparently thought that "[s]o much was due ... the 
rank and dignity of those for whom the provision was 
made .... " Ibid; see also The Federalist No. 81, pp. 
507-509 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). Perhaps more 
importantly, the Framers also thought that the original juris-
diction was a necessary substitute for the powers of war and 
diplomacy that these sovereigns previously had relied upon. 
See Georgia v. Pennsylvania, 324 U. S. 439, 450 (1945); 
United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 641 (1892). "The Su- 1 
preme Court [was] given higher standing than any known tri-
bunal, both by the nature of its rights and the categories sub-
ject to its jurisdiction ... ," A.:...deToqueville, Democracy in 
America, p. 149 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969) (emph asis in original), 
precisely to keep sovereign nations and States from using 
force "to rebuff the exaggerated pretensions of the 
Union .... " Id., at 150. 
'
3 See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme 
Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 665, and n. 3 (1959). 
.. 
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Our cases have long paid tribute to the foreign sovereignty 
and federalism concerns forming the basis of the original ju-
risdiction. See Ames v. Kansas, supra, at 464-465; Mary-
land v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 743 (1981). Out of respect 
for these concerns, the Court has held that Congress is with-
out power to add parties not within the initial grant of origi-
nal jurisdiction, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 17 4 
(1803), and has indicated, in dicta, that Congress may not 
withdraw that jurisdiction either. See, e. g., California v. 
Arizona, 440 U. S. 59, 65-66 (1979); California v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 157 U. S. 229, 261 (1895); Wisconsin v. Pelican 
Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 300 (1888); Ames v. Kansas, 
111 U. S. 449, 464 (1884); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 
Wheat. 304, 332 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, supra, 1 
Cranch, at 17 4. Enlarging the original jurisdiction would re-
quire the sovereigns for whom the provision was made to 
compete with other, less dignified, parties for the Court's 
limited time and resources; diminishing the original jurisdic-
tion possibly would leave those sovereigns without an accept-
able alternative to diplomacy and war for settling disputes. 
To be sure, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act does not expressly 
withdraw the original jurisdiction of this Court. Rather, it 
merely prohibits "any court" from "maintain[ing]" a suit that 
has "the purpose of restraining the assessment and collec-
tion" of Federal taxes. See 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a). The ef-
fect of this prohibition, however, is to preclude this Court 
ever from assuming original jurisdiction to adjudicate a State 
qua State's Tenth and Sixteenth Amendment tax claims, in 
apparent derogation of the grant's constitutional purpose. 14 
"The Solicitor General contends that the Act only fortuitously prevents 
the State of South Carolina from invoking its constitutional claims in this 
Court. See Supplemental Memorandum 6-7. I do not think the fortuity 
of the effect saves the statute from constitutional doubt. As the Solicitor 
General himself reads the Act, it categorically prevents the State of South 
Carolina from maintaining a suit in this Court's original jurisdiction, which 
is precisely what Article III arguably entitles the State to do. The fact 
that a bond interest recipient can litigate the constitutionality of§ 310(b) in 
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While "Congress has broad powers over the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts and over the sovereign immunity of the 
United States[,] it is extremely doubtful that they include the 
power to limit in this manner the original jurisdiction con-
ferred upon this Court by the Constitution." California v. 
Arizona, supra, at 66. 
B 
Nevertheless, it is this Court's long-standing practice to 
avoid resolution of constitutional questions except when ab-
solutely necessary. Ibid. ''When the validity of an act of 
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of 
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the stat-
ute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). Such a construc-
tion is possible in this case. 
The manifest purpose of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act is 
simply to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes 
without undue judicial interference and to require that legal 
challenges be raised in certain designated forums. The lan-
guage and history of the Act evidence a congressional desire 
generally to bar both taxpayer and nontaxpayer suits, since 
both can substantially interrupt "the process of collecting 
taxes on which the government depends for its continued ex-
istence" if left uncontrolled. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 
U. S. 575, 613 (1875). Similarly, the language and history 
evidence a congressional desire to prohibit courts from re-
straining any aspect of the tax laws' administration, since the 
prohibition against injunctions should not depend upon the al-
leged legality or character of a particular assessment. See 
Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 192-194 (1883). Yet the 
statute was enacted against a settled history in which foreign 
and State sovereigns had a unique right to seek refuge in the 
original jurisdiction of this Court. Nothing in the legislative 
due course, see id., at 7, does not mitigate an otherwise effective denial of 
the original forum to the State of South Carolina. 
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history of the Act of 1867, of the later amendments, or of the 
related declaratory judgment provisions enacted in 1974, 
1976, or 1978, mentions any intent to alter these sovereign 
parties' unique right occasionally to seek injunctive relief by 
original action in this Court, even with regard to tax matters. 
¢.Admittedly, the Act precludes "any court" from maintaining 
a suit initiated for the purpose of restraining the assessment 
or collection of Federal taxes. See 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a). 
That language clearly instructs all courts that Congress con- 1 
stitutionally controls not to prematurely interfere with the l 
assessment and collection of Federal taxes. That language 
does not however, necessaril enco ass this Court, which 
Congress did not create and which Congress is not expressly 
empowered to make "Exceptions" or "Regulations" as to its 
original jurisdiction. Moreover, since only a small number of 
pre-enforcement suits could conceivably involve a party for 
whom the original jurisdiction was created, there is no reason 
to believe that Congress would want to have the constitution-
ality of its anti-injunction policy placed into question. 15 
Given this de minimis effect and the absence of express con-
gressional intent to the contrary, I would conclude that the 
Act's reference to "any court" means to assure that all state, 
as well as federal, courts are subject to the anti-injunction 
prohibition. Such an interpretation gives meaning to the 
Act and avoids a grave constitutional question. 16 
'"In this vein, Congress itself has recently questioned its power to with-
draw the Court's original jurisdiction. In enacting the Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act of 1978, which changed the Court's original jurisdiction of actions 
involving ambassadors or foreign states from exclusive to concurrent, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that, "Congress may not deny to 
the Supreme Court jurisdiction which is expressly granted by the Con-
stitution." S. Rep. No. 95-1108, 2d. Sess . ..,6 (1978). 1 
16 Since the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, 
which prohibits "any court of the United States" from declaring rights of 
parties "with respect to Federal taxes," clearly has no jurisdictional effect, 
I have no occasion to address it at this time. 
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III 
Interpreting the Tax Anti-Injunction Act to bar both tax-
payer and nontaxpayer claims in "any court" but this Court 
requires a determination whether this case is "appropriate" 
for the Court's obligatory original jurisdiction. Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 93 (1972). "[A]lthough it may ini-
tially have been contemplated that this Court would always 
exercise its original jurisdiction when properly called upon to 
do so," Ohio v. Wyandotte, 401 U. S. 493, 497 (1971), our 
cases recognize "the need [for] exercise of sound discretion in 
order to protect this Court from an abuse of the opportunity 
to resort to its original jurisdiction .... " Massachusetts v. 
Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 19 (1939). An original party estab-
lishes that a case is "appropriate" for obligatory jurisdiction 
by demonstrating, through "clear and convincing evidence," 
that it has suffered an injury of"serious magnitude," see New 
York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 309 (1921); see also Ala-
bama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286, 292 (1934), and that it other-
wise will be without an alternative forum. Maryland v. 
Louisiana, supra, at 740; Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, at 
93. The State of South Carolina's motion for leave to e sat-
isfies, albeit y t e barest of margins, both of these tests. 17 
-ni"e State has demonstrated injury of "serious magnitude." 
It contends, and provides uncontroverted aff#avits to sup- 4 1 
port, that application of § 310(b)(1) of TEFRA will "materi-
ally interfere with and infringe upon the authority of South 
Carolina to borrow funds." Motion for Leave to File Com-
plaint 7. The authority the State claims has significant his-
torical basis, see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Com-
pany, 157 U. S. 429 (1895), and the injury the State alleges 
could deprive it of a meaningful political choice. See Colo-
rado v. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383, 393, and n. 8 (1943). 
17 The Solicitor General concedes that, absent a bar from the Anti-In-
junction Act, this case falls within the literal terms of the constitutional and 
statutory grant of original jurisdiction to this Court. See Supplemental 
Memorandum 1-2. 
No. 94, Orig.-CONCUR 
18 SOUTH CAROLINA v. REGAN 
Twenty-three states have filed a joint brief amicus curiae in 
support of South Carolina's motion, which further attests to 
the "serious magnitude" of the federalism concerns at issue. 
Similarly, the State qua State has demonstrated that it has 
no adequate alternative forum in which to raise its unique 
Tenth and Sixteenth Amendment claims. See Maryland v. 
Lousiana, supra, at 743, and n. 19. If the State issues 
bearer bonds and urges its purchasers to contest the legality 
of§ 310(b)(1), it will suffer irremedial injury. The purchas-
ers will inevitably demand higher interest rates as compensa-
tion for bearing the risk of future potential Federal taxes. 
Conversely, if the State foresakes bearer bonds in favor of 
registered ones, it will bear the increased expense that issu-
ers of registered bonds incur, and it will be unable ever to 
contest the constitutionality of§ 310(b)(1). In short, the State 
will suffer irremedial injury if the Court does not assume 
original jurisdiction. 
Therefore, although great deference is due the long-stand-
ing congressional policy against premature judicial interfer-
ence with Federal taxes, I believe it is proper to exercise the 
Court's original jurisdiction under these highly unique cir-
cumstances. I emphasize both the unique circumstances of 
this case and the congressional policy against premature judi-
cial interference because original litigants should not be mis-
led into believing that this Court will become a haven for 
suits that cannot be entertained in lower courts with concur-
rent jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction is not a forum for 
litigating everyday tax concerns. Rather, it must be "spar-
ingly" invoked. United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 
(1973). Moreover, the legislative policy against premature 
judicial interference embodied in the Act must be paid the 
highest deference by this Court. Thus, where the original 
party does not present a clear and convincing case that the 
tax at issue will impair its ability to structure integral opera-
tions of its government and that irremedial injury is likely to 
occur absent review in the original jurisdiction, I would defer 
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to the legislative directive against premature judicial inter-
ference. 18 But since South Carolina's claims meet these 
stringent requirements, its motion to file leave should be 
granted. 
IV 
I agree with the Court that the record is not sufficiently \ 
developed to permit us to address the merits and that a Spe-
cial Master should be appointed. But I do not share its view 
that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act applies only when Congress 
has provided an alternative avenue for a complaining party-
one with original status or not-to litigate claims on its own 
behalf. That view is not, in my opinion, based on any fair or 
even tenable canon of statutory construction, and cannot be 
reconciled with express statements of congressional intent 
and purpose. Accordingly, I can concur only in the Court's 
judgment. 
18 Thus, where Congress expressly leaves open an alternative forum in 
which an original plaintiff can raise its claims, this Court will ordinarily 
presume that original jurisdiction is inappropriate. For example, where 
Congress allows the state, but not the federal, courts to issue injunctive 
relief, as Congress has done in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. §52, 
and § 2283 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 2283, an original plaintiff 
could rarely, if ever, demand access to the obligatory original jurisdiction. 
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No. 94 Original 
South Carolina v. Regan 
January 10, 1984 
Thank you very much for your response of January 9. You 
note that Part III of your draft concurrence concludes that the 
exercise of our original jurisdiction is appropriate in this case 
because South Carolina cannot bring a suit in a state court or a 
lower federal court. I gather that it is this view that you 
believe requires that we address the question discussed in your 
Part I whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies to a party that is 
aggrieved by the actions of the IRS and has no alternative for urn 
in which to raise his legal challenge. I still suggest that we 
need not do so. 
I think that it is enough to address the question, as you 
do, whether South Carolina can sue in a lower federal court or a 
state court. However, under your approach, that question does 
not depend on whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies to a party 
without an alternative remedy. You conclude that South Carolina 
has an alternative forum in which to litigate its claims. That 
forum is, of course, this Court. Therefore, under your view is 
it not true that the difficult question whether the Anti-
Injunction Act bars a suit by a party who has no alternative 
forum is simply not presented? For, once you conclude that South 
Carolina may sue in this Court, the question whether they may sue 
in a state court or a lower federal court is governed by the rule 
of Williams Packing: the Anti-Injunction Act bars the suit of a 
party who has an alternative forum in which to litigate his 
claims absent a showing of irreparable harm and certainty of 
success on the merits. Thus, regardless of whether the Act bars 
a suit by a party that has no alternative remedy, South Carolina, 
because it has an alternative remedy in this Court may not bring 
this suit in a state court or a lower federal court. 
-L.-
Perhaps we've reached the point where it would be helpful to 
our discussion to know the views of our colleagues. I'll await 
their responses with interest. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
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No. f4 Original 
South Carolina v. Regan 
I have read your draft concurrence in this 
case with great interest. As I suggested in my 
letter of December 20th, since you conclude that 
the Anti-! nj unction Act does not apply to this 
Court, it is not necessary to reach the question 
wh~ther the Act would apply in the lower federal 
courts in the absence of an alternative remedy. 
Had South Carolina brought this action in a lower 
federal court, any argument that the Act was 
inapplicable because it had no alternative remedy 
would be met with the simple response that a 
remedy exists in this Court. Thus, upon 
reflection, I am convinced that under your 
approach, the question whether the Act would apply 
in the absence of an alternative remedy is not 
properly before this Court. Thus, even were I to 
agree with your Part II (and I do find it 
persuasive}, I couldn't agree that the analysis in 
Part I is necessary to the decis.ion. 
Justice 0' Connor 
Sincerely, 
/' 
~· ,. ,9aJ 




,juvrtmt ~onrt .cf tqt ~ittb ,jtalt.s' 
Jla.s'lrhtgt.cn, J). ~· 2ll~'l~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
January 9, 1984 
No. 94 Original South Carolina v. Regan 
Dear Bill, 
Thank you for your letter concerning my draft 
concurrence in this case. Part II, with which you say you 
might agree, concludes that, despite the all inclusive 
language of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, the purpose and 
history of the Act do not indicate that Congress meantto 
withdraw this Court's original jurisdiction. To reach that 
conclusion it seems to me it is necessary to discuss the 
language, purpose, and history of the statute, giving 
meaning to it all. Moreover, Part III concludes that 
exercise of ou ri inal jurisdiction is a ropriate because 
Sou arolina a non r has no alternat1ve reme in 
e1t er a state or federal court. In s ort, it seems to me 
that Parts II and III necessarily depend upon the analysis 
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No. 94 Orig., South Carolina v. Regan 
Dear John: 
I read your opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part in this case with interest. The question whether 
South Carolina has a legitimate claim on the merits is one 
we should have in mind as we consider whether to exercise 
our original jurisdiction. I am still unsettled, however, 
on what I see as the crucial issue in the case. 
After the Pollock decision, advocates of the income tax 
had to turn to an amendment to the Constitution as a means 
of reviving the tax. In 1909, President Taft, along with 
insurgent Republicans and the Democrats, proposed the joint 
resolution that, in 1913, became the Sixteenth Amendment. 
The most influential opposition to the proposed amendment, 
when it was before the states for ratification, stemmed from 
Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New York. Governor Hughes 
stated that he believed the Federal government should have 
the power to impose an unapportioned income tax. However, 
he recommended against ratification because the words "from 
whatever source derived" in the proposed amendment, "if 
taken in their natural sense," would permit income from 
state and municipal bonds to be taxed by the Federal 
government, a power that would "affqrd the opportunity for 
federal action in violation of the fundamental conditions of 
State authority." Governor Hughes' construction was quoted 
widely throughout the nation. Supporters of the Federal 
income tax then attempted to assure the States that the 
language of the Sixteenth Amendment was not intended to 
apply to the income from state and municipal obligations. 
See 45 Cong. Rec. 1696, 2245, 2247 (1910). Thus, there is a 
substantial argument that the Framers of the Sixteenth 
Amendment intended to codify the holding of Pollock: that 
~ ~·u_ o'~ ~ fk4 -1-kcJ ~ ~ 0.,-t +tu_ 
~s i.J Q ~~uJ ~, ~1$ L.~J-J..,~. 
~.  , ___ , . (}-
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interest from state, county, and municipal bonds could not 
be taxed by the Federal government. 
This Court, at various times since, has indicated that 
the Sixteenth Amendment did not increase the Federal 
government's power to tax such obligations. For example, in 
1916, when Governor Hughes himself was on the Court, it was 
held that the Sixteenth Amendment merely eliminated the 
apportionment requirement. See Brushaber v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11 (1916}. Two years later, the Court 
reviewed the history of the Hughes' message and the 
responses, reaching the same result. See Peck & Co. v. 
Lowe, 247 u.s. 165, 172 (1918}. Then, in 1932, Chief 
Justice Hughes, in upholding the constitutionality of a tax 
on the capital gains from trading in state and municipal 
securities, expressly distinguished that tax from one on 
"the obligations themselves," Willicut v. Bunns, 282 U.S. 
216, 226 (1931}, and concluded that the only subject "held 
to be exempt from Federal taxation is the principal and 
interest of the obligations." Ibid. 
In addition to this original history and subsequent 
judicial interpretation, there are various indications in 
Congress that a constitutional amendment would be necessary 
to secure taxation on the interest earned on state and 
municipal securities. See 76 Cong. Rec. 3588 (1933}; 65 
Cong. Rec. 347 (1924}; id., at 43. 
None of this is conclusive, of course. But I believe 
the original intent of the Framers of the Sixteenth 
Amendment is a constitutional issue worthy of litigation in 
this Court's original jurisdiction. Therefore, without 
expressing any view on the ultimate disposition of the 
merits, I still think the Court should exercise its 
discretion to grant leave to file the complaint. 
Sincerely, 
s~ 
Sandra D •• O'Connor 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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January 13, 1984 
94 Ori.g. South Carolina v. Req~n 
Dear Hill: 
1 have followed with inter.est th~ exch~nge of 
views by vou a.nd Sannra, and note vour lett.er of January 10 
in which vou invjte th~ viBws of ot~er Ju~tices. 
Tn my note of DPcernber 1.9, T advised that r would 
await Sandra's concurring oni.nion. !t se~ms to me that her 
views of. the tax Anti-Tnjunct:.ion Act ar.e fully jn accor.d 
t1ith my opinion for the Court in Bob ,Jones. 
Also, it seems advisable to ~ecide whether South 
Carolina could sue in any other court. I.f there \..rere an 
alt<:!rnat iv€' r(.)medy, T assume we \-IOt.tl.d have decU.ned jur i.s-
diction. The reason South Carolina cannot hrina suit in a 
lower court is becau!=;e the Anti-Iniunction A.ct, as I vi.f'W 
it , io an absolute bar. 
For thesP reasons, J am inclined to joi~ Sandra 
but - in view of your Jetter -will await other views that 
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Re: No. 94 Orig. South Carolina v. Regan 
Dear Sandra: 
I am in substantial accord with your concurring 
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January 24, 1984 
Re: 94 Original - South Carolina v. Regan 
Dear Bill, 
After again exam1n1ng the various writings in this case, I 
would grant leave to file and much prefer your reasons for 
arriving at that result. Sandra takes you to task for 
disregarding the plain language of the statute of §7421, but she 
ends up doing the same thing in the name of avoiding a 
constitutional question, which, by the way, she all but decides. 
Also, as I read her circulating draft at p. 10, barring a 
taxpayer all judicial review would raise constitutional issues. 
Thus, if a taxpayer were involved in this case and had no way to 
turn, §7421 would have to give way, despite its plain language, 
just as it does for Sandra to reach her end result. In 
comparison, construing the section to accommodate a State without 
a remedy for an alleged serious injury to its pocketbook and its 
ability to borrow is not objectionable to me. Furthermore, your 
approach would permit us to refer a state to the District Court, 
which could not be done under Sandra's approach. Although there 
is much in what John says, I agree with you that we should keep 
the case here and grant leave to file. 
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